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ABSTRACT 
 
Traugutt, Alexander. The National Hockey League Totals Market: Efficiency, 
Profitability, and Heuristic Behaviors. Published Doctor of Philosophy 
dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2018. 
 
 
 The National Hockey League (NHL) totals market provides an optimal setting to 
test the theory of efficient markets. Under the notion of market efficiency, prices of an 
asset are reflexive of all publicly available information, making it impossible to enjoy 
consistent, above-average, returns. In contrast to the other major professional sporting 
leagues in North America, the NHL was the last to become fully integrated into 
sportsbooks, thus making it more susceptible to inefficiencies. To date, there has only 
been one published study related to the NHL totals market, which found deviations from 
market efficiency. The present research builds and expands upon these findings by 
analyzing a more expansive dataset, which included the closing total and associated odds 
for each contest. Furthermore, the present work analyzed the efficiency and profitability 
of the market through five betting strategies, each motivated by common heuristics and 
decision making biases. Results indicated that the NHL totals market was largely 
efficient, with only one strategy yielding a marginal above-average return. Thus, the 
influence of heuristics appeared to be appropriately priced in the market. This is 
consistent with the central premise of the market efficiency, in that financial markets are 
efficient with regard to any particular strategy or piece of information over a sustained 
period of time.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The American people are a “people of chance” (Findlay, 1986, p. 4). Capitalism 
in America thrives on the common occurrence of individuals taking chances, speculating 
on uncertain outcomes, and determining the profitability potential of investments. Not 
surprisingly, these capitalistic activities have shaped the practice of gambling, which has 
become an integral part of mainstream culture. In fact, the gambling industry has become 
one of the biggest industries in the United States, in terms of both the amount of revenue 
generated and the number of active participants (Davies & Abram, 2001). While the 
exact number of individuals who wager on sports cannot be effectively determined, 
research estimates that roughly 25 percent of adults in the United States make at least one 
bet on the outcome of a sporting event each year (Davies & Abram, 2001). This 
widespread participation, some would argue, has been a driving force behind the 
popularity of sports in American society. 
 The examination of sport wagering markets has only recently gained significant 
academic attention. This lack of prior attention is tied to the negative stigma associated 
with gambling and a general reluctance to introduce sports gambling into the mainstream 
scholastic model. Despite this, the enormity of the American sports betting market makes 
it an ideal candidate for exploration. Studies have estimated that it alone holds the 
potential to produce $12.4 billion in annual revenue (Purdum, 2015). The American 
Gaming Association estimated that roughly $90 billion was wagered on football (college 
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and professional) in 2016, with $4.7 billion wagered on Super Bowl 51 (American 
Gaming Association, 2016, 2017a). For the month-long 2017 March Madness collegiate 
basketball tournament, an estimated $10.4 billion was wagered by individuals in the 
United States. Even in the arguably less popular sport of Major League Baseball (MLB), 
American sports fans wagered close to $37 billon over the course of the 2017 season 
(American Gaming Association, 2017b). In total, some experts estimate that the 
worldwide sports wagering industry is worth between $500 billion and $1 trillion dollars 
(Campbell, 2013). While research has yet to provide similar wagering estimates for the 
sport of hockey, one can assume that over the course of a season, the National Hockey 
League (NHL) betting market operates as a multi-billion-dollar enterprise.  
 The growth of sports betting has spurred a unique line of research pertaining to 
economic efficiency and profitability (e.g., Gandar, Zuber, & Johnson, 2004; Gandar, 
Zuber, Johnson, & Dare, 2002). This increase in academic attention has coincided with 
growth in the size and liquidity of the various sports betting markets, creating new 
opportunities for empirical research. As the sports wagering industry continues to 
flourish, findings pertaining to economic inefficiency and profitability become even more 
pertinent. 
 Given their parallel nature, many individuals liken investing in the stock market 
to gambling on the outcome of sporting events. As Grant, Johnston, and Kwon 
commented, “betting markets are growing rapidly and are no longer distinct, even 
superficially, from other investment markets” (Grant, Johnstone, & Kwon, 2008, p. 10). 
Fundamentally, individuals who participate in either domain assume the following: a 
potential for financial gain or loss with prior research holding the potential to improve 
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one’s chances of success. Thus, methods for measuring efficiency in the financial sector 
are commonly, and appropriately, used in the sports wagering setting.  
 Despite the obvious parallels, it is important to note inherent differences between 
the two markets. First, the makeup of sporting contests allows for more simplified testing 
of market efficiency. In the financial setting, a stock is infinitely lived. This makes the 
testing of economic efficiency prolonged and cumbersome. Conversely, sporting events 
feature a definitive start and end that is oftentimes realized in the span of a few hours. 
Thus, tests of efficiency and profitability can be conducted in a more simplified manner 
with an abundance of readily available data (Williams, 1999). Second, sports betting is 
largely more difficult and riskier than investing in stocks. As Randall Fine, managing 
director of the casino consulting firm The Fine Point Group noted, “a large, steady 
company has a low chance of plummeting and causing you to lose all your money, but 
even Peyton Manning doesn't cover the spread sometimes” (as cited in Egan, 2014, para. 
11). Nevertheless, many of the strategies used on Wall Street are analogous to the tactics 
used by sports bettors and thus informed this research.  
 Utilization of theories and strategies from the financial sector provide a 
foundation for examining the efficiency of sport wagering markets. The market, however, 
continues to evolve and self-correct. This makes it difficult to develop strategies that can 
achieve consistent above average returns. Thus, the information that may be leveraged 
from analyses of economic inefficiency and profitability is relevant to both academics 
and members of the public. 
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Statement of Purpose 
 The purpose of this research was to analyze the economic efficiency and 
profitability of the NHL totals market through the use of heuristic-based betting 
strategies. The strategies analyzed were constructed using common behavioral biases in 
an effort to provide clearer explanations for any rejections of market efficiency and/or 
instances of significantly positive returns. The totals market in the NHL is an interesting 
market to analyze for a variety of reasons. First, the fact that there is no true favorite or 
underdog makes the testing of traditional biases in their original form invalid, thus 
creating new opportunities for empirical tests. Second, the NHL totals market has 
received the least amount of research attention in comparison to other professional sports 
and even racetrack betting. Lastly, the lack of widespread media attention and low limits 
placed on the market makes it ripe for inefficiency, as oddsmakers may underinvest in the 
development of precise prediction models, given the small potential losses that may be 
incurred from incorrectly setting an over/under line. These points specifically make this 
market more susceptible to financial inefficiency in ways not present in more popular 
markets.  
 In an economically efficient market there is no strategy by which an individual 
could consistently increase their wealth and utility (Bradfield, 2007). This concept is 
what drives the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which is widely regarded as one of 
the most influential and compelling theories in finance and economics (Fama, 1965; 
Malkiel, 2012). At its most basic level the EMH posits that prices of an asset fully reflect 
all publicly available information making it impossible for investors to consistently earn 
above-average profits (Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). In contrast to its initial application 
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in the financial sector, the EMH has become a commonly applied theory for gauging the 
economic efficiency of sports wagering markets and thus served as the theoretical 
foundation of this study. 
 In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of this market, tests of market 
efficiency and profitability were tested against five betting strategies comprised of 
common behavioral biases. As is the case in securities trading, bettors, like investors, are 
known to utilize heuristics, or general rules of thumb, to arrive at decisions more quickly 
without the need for extensive cognitive processing. For this study, the availability and 
representativeness heuristics were utilized as the basis for strategy formulation. Previous 
research has found that inefficiencies in sport wagering markets may be most plausibly 
explained by heuristic behaviors and their influence on the decision making process of 
investors in situations of risk and uncertainty (L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 
2015). 
 Sports wagering markets provide an optimal framework to test the theory of 
efficient markets. The literature concerning this concept in professional sporting leagues 
is extensive, yet lopsided, with most of the focus having been placed on the point spread 
market in the NFL. This has left a gap in the literature concerning other markets, and 
specifically the NHL totals market. Moreover, consistent utilization of heuristics to 
explain bettor behavior in sports wagering markets has only been empirically investigated 
by a few very recent studies. Thus, there is a clear opportunity to utilize these concepts 
and build upon the findings of these recent studies to gain a greater understanding of 
investor behavior on both a micro and macro level. 
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Hypotheses 
 Two separate hypotheses were considered when assessing the efficiency and 
profitability of the five heuristic-based betting strategies. Consistent with previous 
research, a two-step approach was utilized in which significance tests of win proportions 
were first evaluated for market efficiency followed by similar tests for profitability, when 
appropriate (e.g., Sung & Tainsky, 2014; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2000). 
Tests of market efficiency were conducted for in the aggregate and for every odds pairing 
within each strategy based on the following 
HO1: 𝜋 = 𝜌 
H1: 𝜋 > 𝜌 or 𝜋 < 𝜌 
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and 𝜌 is the subjective win probability of a given 
contest from the vantage of the under bettor. When a particular odds pairing rejected the 
null of market efficiency, tests of significance for the profitability of that odds pairing 
were conducted. Such a test was characterized by the following 
HO2: 𝜋 ≤ G 
H2: 𝜋 > G 
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and G is the is break-even win proportion needed 
to achieve profitability. Once appropriate hypotheses tests were conducted for all 
strategies and odds pairings, the success of each strategy was determined based on actual 
financial returns.  
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Rationale 
 To date, no studies have examined the efficiency of the NHL totals market while 
simultaneously seeking to identify the role that biases, or heuristics, played in the bettors’ 
decision making process. While some studies have sought to address the economic 
efficiency of the NHL totals market and assert that their findings supported a particular 
bias (e.g., favorite-longshot bias), they failed to provide empirically tested conclusions 
for their assertions. Therefore, a central objective of the current study was to produce 
more definitive and empirically supported conclusions about the ways in which heuristics 
can explain market (in)efficiency. 
 The widespread popularity of sports wagering in the United States has created a 
scenario where many bettors seek to devise some sort of system or model to 
systematically profit on game outcomes. The fundamental question of whether the NHL 
totals market is efficient, in terms of the lines set by the oddsmakers, has significant 
economic implications for both the sportsbook and the individual bettor as an investor. 
By focusing on well-known heuristics, more accurate betting strategies were devised and 
tested that theoretically account for common bettor biases (which may or may not already 
be accounted for by the bookmakers). This permitted more comprehensive statistical tests 
to be conducted in an effort to better understand bettor biases and whether their 
exploitation can lead to significant and consistent returns.  
Delimitations 
 This study examined the efficiency of the NHL totals market and the extent to 
which common heuristics can explain bettor behavior. The methods for analyzing the 
data were quantitative in nature and pertained only to the NHL. Given the unique nature 
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of this betting market, results can be generalized, with caution, to totals markets in other 
leagues or other financial markets. The varying odds structure and the unique nature of 
this sport were what drove this rationale. Lastly, it is important to note that the function 
of this research was to recognize existing economic inefficiencies. As such, these 
findings should not to be taken as an indication of future performance given the variables 
and scenarios measured. 
Limitations 
1. This research operated under the assumption that sportsbooks seek to balance 
their books as opposed to taking a vested position in the market. Such an 
assumption is consistent with previous research and is necessary to allow for the 
calculation of subjective probabilities and for accurate conclusions to be drawn. If 
it was assumed that bookmakers did not operate in a balancing fashion, the 
statistical tests and subsequent assessments in this study would be considered 
invalid. While it would be ideal to know precisely how bookmakers operate, such 
information is not publicly available. 
2. This study only considered closing totals and associated odds as opposed to 
tracking and assessing line movements. 
3. The manner in which heuristics were considered and exploited was admittedly 
simplistic. It was essential to the author, however, that the results be easily 
interpreted by readers across disciplines. The potential for this information to be 
incorporated into more advanced models is present.   
Definition of Terms 
 Bettor: An individual who places a bet or wager.  
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 Betting line: A proposition, generally involving two teams, on which an 
individual can wager. These lines are affixed with odds so that bettors can calculate 
payouts at the time of wager placement.  
 Bookmaker or Oddsmaker: An individual who calculates odds and sets betting 
lines; generally operating out of a sportsbook. (The definition of sportsbook is provided 
below.) 
 Closing line: The final betting line offered by a bookmaker before the start of a 
contest.  
 Closing total: The final total line (over and under) offered by a bookmaker before 
the start of a contest. 
 Efficient Market Hypothesis: A financial theory that suggests financial markets do 
not allow investors to earn above-average returns because market prices reflect all 
publically available information (Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). 
 Efficiency: (in sports betting) Is determined by examining if returns to the bettor 
are greater than the commission associated with a given wager (L. M. Woodland & B. M. 
Woodland, 2015). 
 Favorite: This side, or total, will always have a negative (-) symbol preceding the 
odds. As such, bettors will need to wager a higher amount to win $100 in comparison to 
the underdog.  
 Heuristics: General rules of thumb that are utilized to reduce the amount of time 
and effort needed to effectively and efficiently make decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). 
 Informed Bettor: Also known as a “wiseguy” or “sharp,” these individuals deal 
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primarily in large figure bets that have the ability to influence the betting market.  
 Odds: In sports betting, odds are utilized to indicate the probability of a particular 
event.  
 Profitability: (in sports betting) Is determined by examining if win percentages 
exceed calculated break-even win proportions, which account for bookmaker 
commissions.  
 Sportsbook: The entity that employs the bookmakers or oddsmakers and pays out 
winnings. 
 Totals Line or Market: A betting structure in which the total number of goals 
(points) is the sole determinant of wager outcome. 
 Underdog: This side, or total, will always have a positive (+) symbol preceding 
the odds. As such, bettors will need to wager a lower amount to win $100 in comparison 
to the favorite. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 The review of literature for this study is divided into five sections. The first 
provides a detailed description of the EMH and the concepts associated with this well-
known financial theory. The second segment focuses on two common heuristics; 
availability and representativeness. Emphasis is placed on description of the biases 
associated with each construct, as these biases are what make each of these concepts 
unique. The third section details the basic functions of the sport wagering market, 
including basic market constructs and the role of bookmakers. Lastly, to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice, a detailed review of the empirical literature concerned with 
applications of the EMH and heuristic theories to the various sports wagering markets 
will be provided. The review will focus on studies of the totals market in each of the four 
major North American sports, as this market is the primary focus of the present research. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 The EMH defined by Fama (1965) and Samuelson (1965) posits that financial 
markets do not allow investors to earn above-average returns because market prices 
incorporate all publically available information. More specifically, Samuelson (1965) 
detailed that in an efficient market, price changes should be unforecastable, or 
unpredictable, if they accurately and appropriately incorporate the information available 
to all market participants. Similarly, Fama (1970) elaborated that the EMH acts under the 
assumption that prices fully reflect all publicly available information. Under this notion, a 
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portfolio built on either technical or fundamental analysis would enable an investor to 
achieve higher returns than one built upon randomly selected holdings, due to the fact 
that prices fluctuate at random. Any abnormal returns are simply interpreted as an EMH 
anomaly (Malkiel, 2012).  
The Random Walk Hypothesis 
The underlying concepts of the EMH are closely tied to the Random Walk 
Hypothesis (RWH), which refers to the mathematical theory of a random walk. In the 
stock market, a random walk is used to describe how incremental or short-term changes 
in prices cannot be predicted by technical analysis because they are completely random. 
Despite this definition, investors and analysts continue to make assumptions regarding 
short-term future price movements.  
 As an illustrative example, consider the following. Envision standing at the 
midpoint of a line drawn on the ground. Using a fair coin, flip the coin ten times and if 
comes up heads, take one step to the right, and vice versa for tails. After ten flips, 
imagine where you may be standing in relation to your original position. Given our 
instinctive nature and biases, we may assume that our final position will not be far from 
our starting place, yet the possibility of ending up 10 steps to the left or right is present. 
Given the assumptions of the RWH, it is not possible to predict the probability of the next 
flip being heads or tails based on the previous outcome. Rather, these events occur at 
random and are completely independent of one another. When you get a consecutive 
string of heads or tails however, these are commonly referred to as “persistent patterns,” 
which occur no more frequently than other instances of chance (Malkiel, 1999). These 
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unsystematic movements in the short-run are what economists refer to when they state 
that stock prices follow a random walk. 
 Unlike the applications of the RWH in the natural sciences, Samuelson (1965) 
argued that randomness in the stock market is achieved by the active participation of 
investors who seek to acquire greater wealth. This is a central component of market 
efficiency and randomness; the assumption that investors seek to obtain greater wealth 
through their participation in the market. Given their motivated involvement, investors 
may utilize any and all information that has the potential to provide them with an 
advantage. In doing so, this information is incorporated into the market prices, which 
quickly eliminates any profitable opportunities. If such a process occurs instantaneously, 
then prices must, by way of this incorporation, reflect all available information. This 
suppresses the possibility for profits to be garnered.  
 Proponents of the RWH refer to the randomness required to achieve market 
efficiency as follows: “the more efficient the market, the more random the sequence of 
price changes generated by such a market, and the most efficient market of all is one in 
which price changes are completely at random and unpredictable” (Lo & MacKinlay, 
1999, p. 4). Note that randomness, in this sense, refers to a “well-functioning and 
efficient market rather than an irrational one” (Malkiel, 2012, p. 79). It is with this 
understanding that Fama (1970) encapsulated this concept in his statement that “prices 
fully reflect all publicly available information” (p. 383).  
 Studies concerned with utilizing the RWH to explain market efficiency have 
fallen subject to a host of criticisms. Most notably, Lo and MacKinlay (1999) argue that 
utilizing the RWH to explain market efficiency is not economically appropriate under all 
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scenarios. Only under certain situations (e.g., risk neutrality), are the two concepts 
interrelated and equivalent. Moreover, as LeRoy (1973) and Lucas (1978) highlight, the 
RWH is not a sufficient concept for explaining the efficiency of security prices. Their 
claims are supported by more recent findings indicating that in the short-term, there is 
evidence of momentum-based inefficiencies in the stock market (Carhart, 1997; 
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Lo & MacKinlay, 1999; Rendelman, Jones, & Latane, 1982; 
Shiller, 2015). These inefficiencies are thought to be a byproduct of the psychological 
biases of each investor. Notably, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that investors are 
subject to bouts of optimism and pessimism, depending on the current health of their 
portfolio. This causes prices to shift from their fundamental values before eventually 
regressing back to the mean. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) link this reaction to the 
overreaction that is common of many well-known heuristics. Thus, a contrarian strategy 
of investing may be the most lucrative as it capitalizes on investor biases.  
 Despite these objections, a litany of empirical evidence from multiple time series 
models supports the notion that prices follow a random walk and that price changes occur 
at random (Cowles & Jones, 1937; Granger & Morgenstern, 1963; Kendall, 1953; 
Osborne, 1977; Roberts, 1959; Working, 1960). Roll (1992) concludes that true market 
inefficiency, such as momentum-based inefficiency, should be an exploitable opportunity 
for an investor. In the absence of these opportunities, it becomes difficult to definitively 
state that prices are non-random and that they do not incorporate all available 
information. As Roll (1992) succinctly states, “real money investment strategies [do not] 
produce the results that academic papers say they should” (p. 28). Malkiel (1999) furthers 
this sentiment, concluding that movements in the stock market, as well as those 
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concerned with individual stocks, are as random as flips of a fair coin. Taken to a greater 
extreme, “it means that a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at a newspaper’s financial 
pages could select a portfolio that would do just as well as one carefully selected by the 
experts” (Malkiel, 1999, p. 24). Thus, neither historical information nor findings from 
technical analysis can be used to forecast outcomes or values in the market, which would 
theoretically render it efficient.  
 Humans prefer order, not randomness. Despite what the RWH posits, it is 
commonplace for individuals to search for patterns among truly random events (e.g., 
stock prices, casino game odds, and sports wagering outcomes). Given the contradictory 
nature of the empirical results, it is difficult to come to a definitive conclusion that 
accounts for these two concepts. Nevertheless, it is evident that academic applications of 
the RWH and the concept of market efficiency have the potential to provide findings that 
are applicable to both the academic and the practitioner. In particular, the RWH can be 
used as a tool to determine the randomness of prices. Based on this information, initial 
conclusions can be drawn regarding market efficiency.  
Testable Variations of the Efficient  
Market Hypothesis 
 
In 1970, Fama proposed a categorized version of the EMH. This included three 
distinct variations of the hypothesis that depend on the type of information believed to be 
reflected in the current asset prices (see also Fama, 1991). These three forms are defined 
as follows: weak, semistrong, and strong. In the weak form of the hypothesis, current 
prices fully incorporate all information contained in price history and trade volume. In the 
weak form, historical patterns in the market are believed to have been already exploited 
to predict future price movement. In the semistrong form, all foundational information 
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about the individual companies, or the market, is accounted for in current prices without 
delay. Thus, individuals cannot capitalize upon certain pieces of news because all 
publicly available information will already be included in the company’s stock valuation. 
Note that as traders capitalize on certain pieces of information that they feel will provide 
them with an advantage, this becomes incorporated into the market prices and thus the 
potential profitable opportunity disappears. Studies concerned with determining whether 
publicly available information can be exploited to improve investment performances are 
generally viewed as tests of the semistrong form (Malkiel, 2012). Lastly, the strong form 
of the hypothesis asserts that while all that is known is already included in market prices, 
everything that is knowable has already been incorporated into market prices. Under this 
form of the hypothesis, even insider trading will not allow traders to achieve long-term 
profitability. All three versions outlined above form the EMH, yet testing of the 
appropriate form based on the context under consideration is customary. 
Objections to the Efficient  
Market Hypothesis 
 
Fama (1970, 1991) provides two thorough reviews of empirical work concerned 
with the EMH. He found that while evidence in support of the theory was extensive, 
contradictory evidence was virtually nonexistent. Nevertheless, researchers have 
continued to pursue various angles to reject the EMH. First and foremost, economists 
attack the fact that the EMH is not a falsifiable theory (de Sousa & Howden, 2015; Fama, 
1970). Rather, it relies on assumptions of how the market will operate and fluctuate. In 
the same manner, it does not provide criteria for measuring efficiency (Alajbeg, Bubas, & 
Sonje, 2012).  
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 Much attention has also been placed on Fama’s (1970) definition of efficiency, or 
lack thereof. He asserts that “the definitional statement that in an efficient market prices 
‘fully reflect’ available information is so general that it has no empirically testable 
implications” (p. 384). This concept has led to a host of criticisms levied from economists 
and researchers who question the fundamental principle of the EMH (Alajbeg et al., 
2012; Collier, 2011; de Sousa & Howden, 2015; Lo, Mamaysky, & Wang, 2000). They 
argue the only way such information could truly be tested is if the market somehow 
provided a subjective timeline of how this information came into existence, was 
processed, and eventually came to be reflected in prices (de Sousa & Howden, 2015). 
Thus, economists and researchers have more concerned themselves with stock price 
movements than with measuring the flow of information. Modern tests are now not as 
concerned with market efficiency, but rather statistical analyses that characterize the 
behavior of markets. 
 Furthermore, researchers are apprehensive to accept the general premise of the 
EMH and the concept of a truly efficient market. As first suggested by Grossman & 
Stiglitz (1980) and noted by Malkiel (2003), “the market cannot be perfectly efficient, or 
there would be no incentive for professionals to uncover information that gets so quickly 
reflected in the market prices” (p. 80). Further, the EMH is often refuted by referencing 
the prolonged financial success of certain investors (e.g., Warren Buffet) and the fact that 
the stock market has been susceptible to bubbles and crashes. Given these irregularities, it 
seems rational to assume that the EMH is a flawed concept. For example, episodes such 
as the 1987 stock market crash, the 2008 housing crisis, and seasonal anomalies such as 
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the “January effect,” are all provided as empirical evidence to disprove the theory of 
market efficiency.  
 Given these market crises, Shiller (1984) commented that the EMH is “one of the 
most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought” (p. 459). However, the 
studies concerned with refuting the EMH are often susceptible to selection bias and fail to 
become widely accepted because their analyses are too narrow to permit generalization. 
Schwert (2003) posits that researchers tend to focus on results that challenge 
preconceived notions or select a combination of variables that will produce statistically 
significant results in one case, but are not applicable to others. Overall, as Fama (1970, 
1991) found in his reviews of published empirical work, there is little evidence to refute 
the efficient markets model. Patterns of inefficiency are never large or steady enough to 
ensure perpetually superior returns. This validates the theory of efficient markets 
(Malkiel, 2003). Moreover, given that the EMH maintains that as information arises it is 
incorporated into market prices, these historical episodes will never again be useful to 
investors. 
The Influence of Heuristics on Decision Making 
 Heuristics provide a shortcut with which individuals make judgments given 
uncertain outcomes. Generally, these processes lead to reasonable and fairly accurate 
estimates in situations where the outcomes are unknown or the mental processes required 
to arrive at a decision are complex. The disadvantage of utilizing heuristics, however, is 
that they subject to systematic and predictable biases. In general, discussions related to 
heuristic theories are concerned with the biases associated with each concept rather than 
their sound decision making abilities. These biases generally provide more insight into 
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various components of human decision making which permits researchers to better 
understand the cognitive processes involved in the processing of information (e.g., 
Borgida & Nisbett, 1977; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
The Availability Heuristic 
Instances of larger classes are better recalled and more often utilized than those of 
smaller classes (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). More 
simply, common events are more easily remembered and referenced than uncommon 
events. The vividness of such information may also influence our decision making, as 
more vivid imagery or testimonials have been found to outweigh statistical summaries of 
similar information (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977). By relying on this heuristic, difficult 
judgements based on frequencies or probabilities can be estimated more simply.  
 To illustrate this concept, consider the following question posed by Tversky & 
Kahneman (1973): If you were to randomly select a word from a piece of text in the 
English language, is it more or less likely that the word will start with the letter K or that 
K will be the third letter? Individuals will assess this question by the degree to which both 
instances come to mind. Generally, it less mentally challenging, meaning that instances 
are more readily available, to think of words that start with the letter K (e.g., kangaroo) 
rather than those with K in the third position (e.g., acknowledge). “If the judgment of 
frequency is mediated by assessed availability, then words that start with K should be 
judged more frequent” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 211). Despite these judgments, a 
typical sample of text contains twice as many words featuring K as the third letter as 
opposed those that start with K (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
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 This example highlights the process by which decisions are made using this 
heuristic and also illuminates the associated biases. Three common biases associated with 
the availability heuristic include those due to retrievability, vividness, and imaginability. 
Biases associated with retrievability will surface when the size of given class is judged by 
the availability of its occurrences. Salience also affects our ability to accurately assess a 
given situation based on availability, or lack thereof. For example, when asked if it is 
more likely to be killed by a shark or a falling airplane part, most people would answer a 
shark attack. Such a conclusion is supported by the fact that information related to shark 
attacks is more available and prominent in our memories given then twenty-four-hour 
news cycle and creation of shark attack movies (e.g., Jaws). We arrive at this conclusions 
despite the fact that the chances of dying from a falling airplane part are nearly “30 times 
greater than the chances of being killed by a shark” (Plous, 1993). Such a scenario 
illustrates how the availability and salience of an event may lead to false conclusions. 
 Concurrently, the vividness of certain events may disproportionally influence an 
individual’s ability to effectively arrive at a lucid conclusion as to the possibility of an 
event occuring. For example, vivid descriptions of events, such as terrorist attacks, may 
exaggerate the possibility that such events could occur in relation to a common crime, 
such as theft. Since “vivid information is more ‘available’ and easier to recall than pallid 
information, it often has a disproportionate influence on judgements” (Plous, 1993, p. 
126).  
 Human mental visualization also factors into decision making, especially when an 
outcome is difficult to imagine (i.e., it has low imaginability). If an individual does not 
have a memory of an outcome, they will imaginatively generate instances and evaluate 
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the probability of the initial event based on those constructed thoughts. If the instance is 
easy to imagine, then it will appear more likely to occur and vice versa (Sherman, 
Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). Moreover, when an event is associated with 
extremely negative or uncomfortable thoughts, individuals may engage in denial over the 
chance that such an event will occur (Rothbart, 1970). For example, when asking a fan of 
a particular sports team what the teams likelihood of success is in the upcoming season, 
individuals will likely provide answers of optimism, even if the outcome is unlikely.  
 The availability heuristic is central to the understanding of judgment and decision 
making. Although definitive conclusions regarding probability estimates are not possible 
given the elusive nature of everyday events, the subjective probability and availability 
associated with their occurrences guide human judgment. By understanding the ease at 
which information comes to mind when one is faced with a making a choice or decision, 
researchers can better understand the processing strategies and influential factors of 
human decision making (Schwarz, 1998).  
The Representativeness Heuristic 
The representativeness heuristic is utilized when making judgments or decisions 
that are based on whether a situation or event is associated with a certain category and the 
strength of this association. As such, this heuristic deals primarily with probabilistic 
questions. In evaluating probabilities, people oftentimes rely on this heuristic to 
determine the “degree by which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A 
resembles B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). In this process, “one compares the 
essential features of the event to those of the structure from which it originates” (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). Consider the following example: Max is a very solid and 
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muscular dog who is extremely loyal to his owner and protective of his household. His 
disposition is fairly serious and he does not often play with other dogs. Would you infer 
Max to be: a Labrador Retriever, a Cocker Spaniel, or a Doberman? These characteristics 
would lead us to infer that Max is most likely representative of the stereotype of a 
Doberman. As such, research has shown that individuals perceive probability and 
similarity in virtually the same way (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The 
representativeness heuristic is susceptible to arguably the largest amount of biases, as 
representativeness fails to account for factors that should affect rational probabilistic 
judgments (Plous, 1993). The most notable biases of this type are detailed below. 
 In circumstances where descriptions of people or events are not available, some 
researchers maintain that Bayesian inference is employed (Edwards, 2002; Peterson & 
Beach, 1967; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Bayes’ rule is a probability theory that 
determines the posterior probability of a given event, A, after data from B has been 
observed (Bayes & Price, 1763; Edwards, 1968, 1971, 2002). When descriptions are 
added however, prior probabilities are ignored. This creates a conjunction effect, or a 
conjunction fallacy, in which individuals perceive that the more information that is 
provided, the more likely that an event will occur (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Rationally, however, the simultaneous co-occurrence of two events cannot be more than 
the probability of those events occurring separately (Morier & Borgida, 1984; Plous, 
1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, 1983). “As the amount of detail in a scenario 
increases, its probability can only decrease, but its representativeness and hence its 
apparent likelihood may increase” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 98). The 
representative heuristic is a primary driver of the unwarranted appeal of more detailed 
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information and the illusionary sense of insight that these details provide in arriving at a 
conclusion. 
 Contrary to statistical reasoning, individuals tend to fail to account for sample size 
when utilizing the representativeness heuristic. Termed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1971) as the law of small numbers, judgments are made by the proportion included in 
the sample while omitting reference to the size of the sample. Such a concept is a satirical 
reference to the law in statistics known as the “law of large numbers,” which posits that 
the larger the sample you draw from a population, the closer the average of that group 
will be to the population average. A belief in the law of small numbers suggests that a 
random sample of a population will resemble the population more closely than statistical 
sampling would suggest (Plous, 1993). Such a belief violates the foundational concepts of 
sampling, yet is a common bias associated with this heuristic.  
 The law of small numbers also explains the misappropriation of chance exhibited 
by many individuals when engaging in probability judgments. When they have prior 
knowledge or experience of an event, people often expect that certain characteristics will 
be represented. For example, when flipping a coin multiple times, we expect that both 
heads and tails will be contained in the sequence (e.g., heads, tails, tails, heads), as 
opposed to solely heads or tails (e.g., heads, heads, heads, heads). When subjects are 
asked to create sequences for tosses of a fair coin, the heads/tails proportions remain 
much closer to 50% than the laws of chance would suggest (Tune, 1964). The 
representativeness heuristic leads individuals to disregard the notion of chance in 
predicting events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). This also leads individuals to commit 
the “gamblers fallacy,” or the belief that a string of “bad luck” events must be followed 
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by a successful outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Take lottery drawings for 
example: after a number has been drawn, the amount bet or the degree to which that same 
number is selected in subsequent drawings is expected to decline considerably (Clotfelter 
& Cook, 1993; Suetens, Tyran, & Galbo-Jorgensen, 2016; Terrell, 1994). Similar 
findings have also been presented for the casino game roulette, in which gamblers expect 
that a black number is more likely to occur after a string of red numbers (Croson & 
Sundali, 2005). 
 Perhaps the most well-known example involving the law of small numbers is the 
“hot-hand” fallacy. In basketball, a player with a hot-hand is thought to be more likely to 
convert a basket after one or more successful shots versus having missed the previous 
shot. Statistical reasoning, however, suggests that the chances of making the next basket 
are not significantly different from the player’s overall chance of making a basket 
(Camerer, 1989; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). Detailed analyses of shooting 
records of the Philadelphia 76er’s, Boston Celtics, and the Cornell men’s and women’s 
basketball programs by Gilovich et al. (1985) provided no evidence in support of the 
notion of a hot-hand. Belief in the hot-hand fallacy can be attributed to “a general 
misconception of chance according to which even short random sequences are thought to 
be highly representative of their generating process” (Gilovich et al., 1985, p. 295). 
Nevertheless, players and coaches continue to assess their own abilities and make 
personnel decisions based on this fallacy, while failing to account for sample size.   
 Lastly, individuals often fail to take into account trends of general regression. For 
reference, regression to the mean is a statistical phenomenon in which particularly high or 
low scores are generally followed by more average scores. Individuals fail to correctly 
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account for this phenomenon for two primary reasons. First, they do not expect 
regression to occur in the given context, generally due to overconfidence or inhibited 
reasoning (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 2015). Secondly, in the presence of 
regression, they invent false causal explanations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This 
leads to the overestimation of certain performance measures and underestimates the 
effectiveness of others. For example, in social interaction and behavior training, 
individuals tend to believe that punishments are appropriate after poor performance and 
rewards are suitable following a good performance. This common reward structure fails 
to account for the concept of regression to the mean, which suggests that after a poor 
performance, behavior is statistically more likely to improve, regardless of reward. 
“Consequently, the human condition is that, by chance alone, one is most often rewarded 
for punishing others and most often punished for rewarding them” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). People are generally not aware of this concept and thus fail to 
account for its influence on the decision making process. 
 In representativeness, “one compares the essential features of the event to those of 
the structure from which it originates” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). In judging 
the likelihood of an event based on the observations of similar events, one forms 
decisions based on representativeness reasoning. While this heuristic is useful in 
probabilistic decision making, one must be aware of the associated biases when analyzing 
this process. Failure to account for these biases leads to systematic errors in judgment. 
Criticisms of Heuristic Theories 
The concept of heuristics and their associated biases have promulgated a host of 
criticisms (e.g., Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997; Gigerenzer, 1991; Macchi, 1995; 
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Ortmann & Hertwig, 2000; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 1991). Constraints on 
the present paper do not provide space for a detailed review, but central criticisms focus 
on the general pessimistic account that heuristic theory offers of human behavior, the 
representativeness and generalizability of empirical findings, and a failure to account for 
ecological validity. A common critique regarding heuristic research is that it offers a 
negative outlook on one’s “ability to make sound and effective judgments” (Gilovich & 
Griffin, 2002, p. 8). Critics note that humans have “split the atom, recombined DNA, and 
travelled to the moon” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 8), feats that they may not have been 
able to accomplish if their judgments were constantly biased. Thus, some critics view 
heuristic research as unproductive because it belittles “human decision makers as 
systematically flawed bumblers” (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2000, para. 2).  
 Another critique stems from the notion that research in support of heuristic 
decision making may be nothing more than a laboratory hoax. There are a set of 
assumptions that undoubtedly accompany participation in a psychology experiment. 
These may influence how human subjects behave; participants may misconstrue a 
question or fail to anticipate how a certain stimulus will influence judgment, which may 
skew results or limit the generalizability of findings. Data may also be influenced by the 
effects of “experimenter bias,” which describes the phenomenon in which an 
experimenter’s behavior may influence the participant’s responses in an unintended way 
(Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978). If a researcher is 
more motivated to validate his or her a priori conclusions rather than understand the true 
nature of the human decision making process, they may subconsciously pose misleading 
questions to study participants. These criticisms illustrate the point that one should be 
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mindful of the context and lab setting in question when analyzing and ultimately 
generalizing the findings of heuristics-based research.  
Closely related to the issues stemming from laboratory studies is the belief that 
such research fails to account for ecological validity. As described by Brunswik (1937, 
1956, 1957), ecological validity is the degree of correlation between a proximal cue and a 
distal object variable.1 Within our natural environment, these cues influence our 
perception and ultimately our decision making. For example, in a test of perception, one 
may assess the correlation between vertical position (proximal cue) and size of an object 
(distal object) since larger objects tend to be higher in our field of vision (Hammond, 
1998). Heuristic research places an emphasis on the identification of the cues that humans 
use to make judgments, but fails to assess the true value, or ecological validity, of the 
cues themselves (e.g., Schwarz, et al., 1991; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002). To do so would 
require the identification of all relevant objects in a specific subject area and 
subsequently classifying each object given the value of the cue variable (Gilovich & 
Griffin, 2002). Such a task would require a large number of resources thus heuristic 
research has placed focus on the identification of cues rather than evaluating the 
significance of those cues.  
While the various criticisms of heuristics-based research are important to note, it 
is evident that findings in support of heuristic theory span a robust and varied set of 
contexts that detail human interaction. These findings contribute to useful theoretical 
                                                 
1 This concept should not be confused with the term representative design, which deals 
with how well the setting within which the experiment was conducted represents similar 
environmental conditions (Brunswik, 1956). 
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constructs that help to explain the principles and constraints on the human decision 
making process.  
Sport Wagering Market  
Constructs 
 Before reviewing the literature concerned with measuring market efficiency in 
sport wagering markets, it is imperative to understand the basic constructs and the role of 
bookmakers in these various markets. Most importantly, there are a host of parallels 
between trading in the financial sector and sports wagering that permit the use of the 
aforementioned financial theories. In both arenas, investors, or bettors, with varied beliefs 
and sources of information, seek to profit through trading propositions that resolve over 
time. Unlike the stock market where prices are infinitely lived, outcomes in the various 
sport wagering markets are instantaneously known at the conclusion of a given contest, 
making them prime subjects for empirical analysis. Furthermore, in both settings, 
participants engage in a zero-sum proposition, meaning that there is a winner and a loser 
in each transaction. This allows for further evaluation of the financial impact that the 
outcome has on either party.  
 Lastly, the magnitude of these markets makes them attractive for both investors 
and researchers. As previously mentioned, the sport wagering industry is estimated to be 
worth roughly $1 trillion. This rivals many of the world’s largest financial markets, such 
as the New York Stock Exchange, the world’s largest Initial Public Offering provider, 
which is estimated to hold over $1 trillion in market capital (Desjardins, 2016). The size 
of the sport wagering industry makes it a compelling avenue for exploration, as findings 
have the potential to appeal to a large portion of the population. 
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 Despite these similarities, it is important to note the way in which these markets 
differ. Prices in the financial sector fluctuate and change frequently, where the final price 
is set at a level that matches supply with demand. Thus, market makers set prices to 
match buyers with sellers. In contrast, oddsmakers, or bookmakers, generally set an 
initial price that is subsequently adjusted in small increments to varying frequencies. Two 
primary schools of thought have emerged regarding the role of bookmakers. On one 
hand, researchers and industry experts believe that oddsmakers set prices that equalize 
the number of wagers on each side of a given proposition. That is, they attempt to match 
supply with demand to limit their risk and ensure a profit, regardless of the outcome. If 
the initial price is incorrect or inefficient, however, the bookmaker may subject himself to 
a large degree of risk, especially if informed bettors capitalize on the pricing error. 
Nevertheless, bookmakers are believed to incorporate all publicly available information 
while also accounting for common bettor biases when setting the final closing line. 
 Conversely, the other school of thought maintains that bookmakers do not set 
prices to equalize the amount wagered on both sides. Rather, bookmakers set prices that 
exploit bettor biases. This allows them to capitalize on their ability to predict outcomes 
more accurately than the average bettor. Thus, oddsmakers themselves become active 
participants in the wagering process. As a result, greater profits can be obtained than if 
prices were set in the traditional market sense in avoidance of substantial risk. Give that 
there are some bettors who are as skillful in picking games as the bookmakers, dollar 
limits on how much money can be wagered are set by sportsbooks to limit the distortion 
of prices from reaching a point that could create profitable opportunities (Levitt, 2004). 
Thus, one could make the case that the true difference between the financial and sport 
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wagering market lies in the ability of a small set of individuals to predict game outcomes 
more accurately than the general public. In the financial sector, “the flow of inside 
information or the inherent complexity in valuing companies may make it impossible for 
one individual to do better than the market, meaning that a market maker who acted like a 
bookmaker would do worse than one who simply equilibrated supply and demand” 
(Levitt, 2004, p. 245). Such a claim is supported by the lack of evidence regarding the 
ability of investors to beat the market over a sustainable period.  
 Most empirical research assumes that bookmakers do not take informed positions 
against bettors. As L. M. Woodland and B. M. Woodland (1994) point out, when 
bookmakers do not attempt to balance the wagers, their earnings become dependent on 
the outcome of a given contest. Thus, “questions of market efficiency cannot be 
addressed because subjective probabilities are revealed only when the books are 
balanced” (L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 1994, p. 272). While this study will 
operate under the balanced book assumption, it is important to note that two different 
schools of thought exist within the various sport wagering markets.  
 There are three primary outcomes on which bettors can wager in the NFL, NBA, 
MLB and NHL: the point spread, which is a bet on a point differential between 
opponents, the moneyline or oddsline, which is concerned with solely selecting the 
winner in a contest, and the total line, which requires the bettor to select whether the 
combined score of both teams will go over or under the line set by the bookmakers. 
Hereafter, each of these outcomes will be referred to as markets (e.g., the totals market). 
For further clarification, sample betting lines for an NFL game are provided below. 
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Table 2.1 
Sample NFL Betting Lines 
Team Point Spread Money/OddsLine Total 
Denver Broncos –7.5 –110 Over 47 
New England Patriots +7.5 +110 Under 47 
 
 In this example, the Denver Broncos are considered the visiting favorite while the 
New England Patriots are the home underdog. If the bettor were to wager on the point 
spread, he would need to choose either that the Broncos would win by more than 7.5 
points or that the Patriots would lose by less than 7.5 points. A wager on the moneyline 
would require the bettor to wager $110 to win $100 if he favored the Broncos, or $100 to 
win $110 if he believed that the Patriots would win. Lastly, a wager on the total, which is 
not connected to either team, would require the bettor to decide whether the two teams 
would score over a combined 47 points or under a combined 47 points. If the final score 
features a total that is exactly 47, then the bet is considered a push and all money is 
returned.  
 In addition to a basic understanding of these markets, it is also necessary to 
understand the concept of a fair bet and profitability. Violation of a fair bet, or an 
efficient market, occurs when a win percentage for a certain betting strategy deviates 
from 50%, setting the null hypothesis for a fair bet at 50%. For example, if consistently 
betting on the home team to beat the spread in the NFL yields a win percentage of 57% 
and this was found to be significantly different from chance (50%), this strategy would 
violate the null of a fair bet.  
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 The $11/$10 (–110, 100) betting rule implies that bettors wager $11 to win $10, 
known as flat odds. Within sports betting, a flat bet is always booked at odds of 11 to 10 
regardless of the market or sport. Under the $11/$10 betting rule, profitability is realized 
when a win percentage of 52.38% is achieved and found to be statistically significant, as 
initially suggested by Vergin & Scriabin (1978). The following equation details the 
determination of the proportion of a winning bet by setting expected winnings equal to 
expected losses. 
𝑃($100) = (1 − 𝑃)($110) 
or 
𝑃 ∗ $100 + (1 − 𝑃)(−$110) = 0 
P refers to the probability of winning a wager (i.e., the “break-even probability”), and 
signifies the probability of losing the wager. $100 and –$110 correspond to the initial 
odds on which individuals wager. From these equations, the break-even probability, P, is 
.5238, indicating that the chances of a bettor neither earning a profit nor losing money is 
.5238, or 52.38%. This figure also accounts for the commissions, or vigorish, paid to 
bookmakers by factoring in the initial odds (Vergin & Scriabin, 1978). 
 While bets in the NFL and NBA on the point spread and totals occur at $11/$10 
odds, in the MLB and NHL these lines are posted with an odds adjustment. This is due to 
the smaller variance of scoring in the MLB and NHL, which forces bettors to wager 
additional money on the more popular side of the proposition in order for bookmakers to 
better balance the number of wagers on each side (Paul & Weinbach, 2004). Thus, while 
the 52.38% is the standard, the measure of profitability must be recalculated if the odds 
are variable.  
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 Wagering markets are essentially simplified financial markets. Both operate under 
the premise that prices are inclusive of all publicly available information, while investors, 
or bettors, seek to profit by trading on outcomes that are uncertain. Through analysis of 
publicly available information, individuals largely believe that they can beat the market 
in a manner that will allow them to enjoy above-average returns. Moreover, sports 
betting, much like financial trading, is “a zero-sum game with one trader on each side of 
the transaction” (Levitt, 2004, p. 223). Sport gambling markets do provide a unique 
aspect, however, which make them prime for measurement under the EMH: they have a 
definitive start and end. This makes the processing of profits and losses much quicker 
(Paul, Weinbach, & Wilson, 2004). To this point, Thaler and Ziemba (1988) note, “Since 
a stock is infinitely lived, its value today depends both on the present value of future cash 
flows and on the price someone will pay for the security tomorrow” (p. 162). In contrast, 
the payout of a wager is immediately determined once the contest has ended. Thus, 
“wagering markets can provide a clear view of pricing issues which are more 
complicated elsewhere” (Sauer, 1998, p. 2021). 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
Sport Wagering Markets 
 
 Pankoff (1968) spurned the testing of market efficiency in sports wagering 
markets and specifically directed the focus on point spreads. His initial study, which 
utilized a regression-based model, found that market inefficiencies in the NFL were too 
minute to detect. This motivated a line of empirical research focused solely on point 
spreads via a host of regression-based analyses (Gandar, Zuber, O’Brien, & Russo, 1988; 
Golec & Tamarkin, 1991; Sauer, Brajer, Ferris, & Marr, 1988; Vergin & Scriabin, 1978). 
Notably, Vergin and Scriabin (1978) found reasonable evidence to suggest that the NFL’s 
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point spread market was inefficient. However, Tryfos and colleagues questioned these 
findings, citing statistical errors that may have resulted in the inaccurate reporting of 
profitable statistics (Tryfos, Casey, Cook, Leger, & Pylypiak, 1984).  
 More recent studies have found clear violations of an efficient market under the 
favorite-longshot bias. Well-documented in horse racing, this bias implies that longshots, 
or underdogs, are over bet in relation to favorites in the hopes of larger payouts. In the 
mainstream sports arena, the reverse of the favorite-longshot bias, where favorites garner 
more wagers than the underdog, has resulted in consistent returns to the underdog bettor 
(Gandar et al., 2004; Gandar et al., 2002; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010; L. 
M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 1994, 2001, 2003). Such a bias is said to stem from 
bettors who incorrectly price the contests and fail to properly assess the likelihood of 
certain outcomes. These biases may be attributable to certain heuristics that lead to 
misperceptions regarding the probabilities of certain outcomes. Studies relating to this 
topic have largely utilized heuristic applications to account for bettors’ gambling beliefs, 
including the gamblers fallacy and an aversion to accept losses without explanation 
(Gilovich, 1983; Wagenaar, 1988). As of yet, few empirical studies have been conducted 
that evaluate the degree to which heuristics explain sports gambling behavior in 
particular. 
 While market factors undoubtedly play a role in these findings, adjustments and 
advancements in statistical analyses should not be ignored. Instead of the basic regression 
model used by Pankoff (1968) and many of the early studies, recent research now uses 
more advanced ordinary least squares and probit regression models. These recent studies 
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generally include additional predictors and more complete data that allow for more 
accurate conclusions to be drawn. 
 Researchers now have the opportunity to explore less-publicized betting 
constructs, such as the totals market, due to advancements in betting technologies and 
data availability. The totals market, in particular, creates an interesting avenue for 
research, given that bettors have a known affinity towards over bets. As Paul and 
Weinbach (2002) note, “psychologically, if a gambler has a rooting interest in his or her 
bet and is not just viewing the activity as an investment option, it makes logical sense that 
the over becomes a more popular bet than the under, as rooting for scoring tends to be 
easier than cheering for a lack of scoring” (p. 259). The remainder of this review will be 
primarily concerned with the literature focused on the totals market in the four major 
North American professional sporting leagues.  
National Football League 
Initial analyses of the totals market in the NFL conducted by Even and Noble 
(1992) and Gandar, Zuber, and Russo (1993) found evidence of no inefficiencies or 
profitable betting strategies within the NFL’s totals market. Conversely, Kochman, and 
Badarinathi (1996) found that while widespread opportunities for profitability were not 
present, team-specific opportunities did emerge. Paul and Weinbach (2002) carried out 
possibly the most extensive study in this market, analyzing totals from the seasons 
spanning 1979–2000. While their findings did reveal that the overall market was 
efficient, there were instances where profitability could be achieved for particularly high 
point totals. Starting with the totals that were set 5, 6, and 7 points away from the sample 
mean of 40.3, their results indicated a rejection of the null of a fair bet in all three subsets 
  
  
36 
of games for the under bettor. For the games farthest from the sample mean, the null for a 
fair bet and profitability were rejected. This finding runs counter to the psychological 
underpinnings of most gamblers who view gambling on sports as a recreational activity. 
Those who view the game with a rooting interest are more likely to cheer for scoring as 
opposed to a lack of scoring (Paul & Weinbach, 2002). The findings of Paul and 
Weinbach (2002) have motivated studies of high point totals and inefficiencies in other 
professional leagues. The authors do note, however, that such a strategy in the NFL is not 
likely to last, given the efficient nature of gambling markets.  
National Basketball Association 
The market for totals in the NBA has received little research attention. As in the 
NFL, Paul, Weinbach, and Wilson (2004) found empirical evidence to suggest a violation 
of a fair bet for the highest point totals. Starting with the total line of 200, the totals 
measured were increased by one point until they reached 210, which was the last total 
with sufficient observations to accurately conduct statistical analyses. For totals greater 
than 202, 204, 206, 207, and 208, the null of a fair bet was rejected for the under bettor 
(Paul et al., 2004). For the same totals however, no evidence was found to reject the null 
of no profitability. Much like in the NFL, the psychological preference of bettors to 
wager on the over should be noted.  
 Given that the totals market in both the NFL and NBA operate with an identical 
flat-odds structure, this highlights the question of why informed bettors do not adopt a 
contrarian approach to the public and drive the total line back to its efficient value. The 
economic answer may be found in the limits placed on the different markets. In the NFL 
totals market, limits on single bets can vary between $2,000 and $5,000, while in the 
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NBA limits average around $2,000 (Paul et al., 2004). As the betting action pours into the 
various sports books, lines are adjusted to even the betting on both sides of the 
proposition. Generally, members of the public will shift lines away from their true market 
value, which creates profitable avenues for certain informed bettors. For example, expert 
bettors, or “wise guys,” in the point spread market, where limits are much higher, can 
wager enough money on a given side to drive the line back to an efficient value. This 
thwarts the possibility for the average bettor to achieve consistently high returns. 
However, the low limits placed on the totals markets “restrict the possibility for informed 
wise guys to bet a large enough amount to drive the line back to its efficient value” (Paul 
& Weinbach, 2002, p. 261). Since per-game betting volume is lower in the NBA than in 
the NFL, it is more likely that informed bettors in the NFL market have the potential to 
eliminate profitable opportunities that may arise when the line deviates from its efficient 
market value. 
Major League Baseball 
Counter to the flat-odds market structure present in the NFL and NBA, the MLB 
and NHL employ a variable odds model. For example, the total line the MLB may read as 
follows:  
 Colorado Rockies at Los Angeles Dodgers: 11over-130; 11under+110 
This is commonly referred to as a 20-cent line because the difference between 130 and 
110 (ignoring positive/negative signs) is 20. In this scenario, the closing total is 11 runs 
with an over bettor wagering $130 to win $100. Conversely, the under bettor would have 
to bet $100 to win $110. Given this, Brown and Abraham (2002) found that over/under 
outcomes tended to miss in streaks. More specifically, betting that a team’s win streak 
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against the posted total would continue was found to be profitable for the 1997 season. 
Such a finding was not found to exist in any other season studied. Brown and Abraham 
(2002) suggested that this unique result could be attributable to the expansion, 
realignment, and introduction of interleague play during the 1997 season, as similar 
inefficiencies disappeared for the 1998 season.  
 This initial study sparked a debate among researchers concerned with Brown and 
Abraham’s (2002) failure to include odds in their initial analysis. Instead, they opted to 
follow a simple strategy of determining win percentages over 54.5% as profitable. Paul 
and Weinbach (2004) commented that the findings should not be considered valid, as the 
study failed to properly calculate profits and losses. The implied odds of Brown and 
Abraham (2004) took the form of a 40-cent line (uncommon in the baseball totals 
market). Furthermore, the authors failed to provide corresponding odds adjustments for 
each game, instead utilizing a simple break-even point of 54.5%.  
 Brown and Abraham (2004) replied to Paul and Weinbach’s (2004) comment by 
stating their estimates of efficiency were conservative and that use of a 20-cent line 
would have deemed even more of their strategies as profitable. Further, the authors stated 
that their original research was concerned with betting on streaks, not necessarily with the 
exact amount of dollars won. Also providing commentary on this debate, Gandar and 
Zuber (2004) supported the claims of Paul and Weinbach (2004). They maintained a 
constant break-even proportion is not appropriate for testing profitability in this market. 
They went on to conduct their own analysis, which asserted that there is no way to 
confirm the returns for the original strategy proposed by Brown and Abraham (2002) 
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without the inclusion of the actual odds. Thus, the findings of Brown and Abraham 
(2002) should be interpreted and applied with caution.  
 Bickel and Kim (2014) is the most recent study concerned with this market. This 
study accounted for the issues highlighted by the previous debate by including individual 
game odds in the analysis. Little evidence was found to suggest the market was 
inefficient. The authors did find some season-specific inefficiencies, but these were 
isolated and did not translate from year to year.  
National Hockey League 
While markets in the NFL, NBA, and MLB have received the most research 
attention, the NHL market remains largely understudied. While a host of factors may be 
attributable to the lack of previous literature, one contributing factor is the fact that the 
NHL was the last of the four major North American sports to be integrated on a 
consistent level by sportsbooks (L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2001). That is, all 
NHL games and betting lines were not always offered for wagering purposes. Like the 
totals market for the NFL and NBA, B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2010) found 
that a clear under bias existed in the NHL totals market, especially for high goal totals. 
The EMH was rejected in multiple cases with limited opportunities for profitability. The 
degree of inefficiency and profitability found in this market suggests that it is the least 
attuned in terms of appropriately pricing contests of the four major sports. B. M. 
Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2010) failed, however, to account for the odds 
associated with each total. They utilized a simple strategy of denoting profitability when 
win percentages exceed 52.38%, which has been proven to be insufficient in the variable 
odds markets (Gandar & Zuber, 2004; Paul & Weinbach, 2004).  
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Heuristic Theories and Sport Wagering Markets 
 The application of heuristics to specific sports betting markets and the extent to 
which these concepts can explain market efficiency and bettor behavior has been 
undertaken by a few recent studies (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015, 2016; L. 
M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2015). Recall that market efficiency and the EMH 
suggest that it is impossible for investors to consistently earn above-average profits 
because markets fully reflect all publicly available information with little or no lag time 
(Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). These studies examined the efficiency of the season 
wins total markets for the NFL, NBA, and MLB. In the season wins total market, 
oddsmakers set a line that represents the total number of games they believe a certain 
team will win over an entire season, excluding the playoffs. Note that since the posted 
odds are only applicable to a single team and not a contest, there is no identifiable 
favorite or underdog. Research concerning the NHL season win totals market has yet to 
be conducted, possibly due to the lack of available data.  
 L. M. Woodland and Woodland (2015) proposed several betting strategies for 
testing the efficiency of the NFL wins total market. They found the market to be highly 
inefficient, citing several strategies for profitability. L. M. Woodland and Woodland 
(2015) posited that inefficiencies may be driven by the representative heuristic, in that 
bettors tend to overreact to recent information and fail to account for certain biases, 
including regression to the mean. Another potential explanation for these profitable 
returns may lie in the makeup of the market. Betting volumes in this market are 
significantly lower than those in other markets. At the Mirage in Las Vegas, for example, 
bettors can wager up to $100,000 on a point spread bet in the NFL. Conversely, the limit 
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on the season wins totals market is closer to $2,000 at the same casino (L. M. Woodland 
& B. M. Woodland, 2015). These low limits, coupled with the fact that this type of wager 
takes at least four months to pay out, may explain the desire for expert bettors to spend 
their money elsewhere.  
 In the NBA, B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2015) found the market to be 
more efficient than in the NFL, yet profitable returns still emerged for certain strategies. 
An explanation for this finding is that the NBA may attract a more sophisticated bettor 
than the NFL. As Reber (1996) posited, “basketball has historically attracted the most 
sophisticated sports bettors, folks who are more knowledgeable about the game than 
those who bet [on] football and baseball” (p. 309). Sophisticated bettors such as these 
may be able to avoid the pitfalls of heuristic-based inefficiencies, such as betting against 
public opinion or failing to account for regression to the mean. However, the authors note 
that there were instances in which bettors overvalued a team’s performance in past 
seasons. These bettors associated past performance with future outcomes, a trait 
indicative of the representativeness heuristic.  
 The authors further posit that the presence of “glamor” teams may provide a 
potential explanation for profitability measures. As Egon, Verbeek, and Nuesch (2011) 
concluded, “more glamorous teams have a larger fan base and are, therefore, more prone 
to attracting sentiment bets. In essence there is ceteris paribus an excessive proportion of 
stakes placed on the relatively more popular team winning” (p. 505). In the NBA, the Los 
Angeles Lakers qualify as a glamor team and are largely overbet by recreational bettors 
whose betting interests lie in entertainment. Furthermore, Flepp, Nuesch, and Franck 
(2016), suggest that bettors are susceptible to a loyalty bias, which prohibits them from 
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betting against their favorite team. Consideration of the influential power of sentiment 
and loyalty biases motivated B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2015) to rerun their 
analyses for only the Los Angeles Lakers. They found that bettors drastically overbet the 
glamor team, creating a clear inefficiency for the under bettor. These findings confirm the 
sentiment bias proposed by Egon et al. (2011) as well as the loyalty bias identified by 
Flepp et al. (2016).  
 Like the NFL and NBA, the MLB season wins total market was found to be 
inefficient with opportunities for profitability given certain betting strategies. B. M. 
Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2016) found that bettors exhibited a clear tendency to 
overvalue a team’s performance in a previous season, especially if they achieved a 
winning record. Much like the NFL season wins total market, bettors failed to account for 
the regression to the mean concept. These mispriced strategies yielded results that were 
stronger than those for the NBA, yet weaker than those in the NFL. Successful strategies 
were generally limited to the under bettor, which is consistent with previous research 
indicating that the bettors prefer the over wager when it comes to the totals market (Paul 
& Weinbach, 2002). In the season wins total market, instead of cheering for points, 
bettors root for wins, which may contribute to these inefficiencies.  
 Sports wagering markets provide an optimal framework to test the theory of an 
efficient market. The literature concerning market efficiency in the professional sporting 
leagues has been extensive, yet lopsided. Much of the research has focused on the point 
spread market in the NFL, which has left a gap in the literature concerning other markets, 
specifically the various totals markets. Although minimally studied, these markets appear 
to feature a level of inefficiency with trace opportunities to achieve profitability, 
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especially for high point/goal totals. Though largely overlooked, the totals market 
provides an optimal setting within which to measure market efficiency where complete 
data has become readily available. Furthermore, the NHL, in comparison to the NFL, 
NBA, and MLB, has experienced the most significant changes to its league structure 
through the formation of new teams, realignment of conferences, and the creation of four 
separate intra-conference divisions (Pacific, Central, Metropolitan, and Atlantic). These 
changes may contribute to more recent inefficiencies not captured by previous studies. 
Thus, a clear opportunity exists to further examine this market to uncover potential 
inefficiencies.
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study focused primarily on semistrong tests of market efficiency. That is, 
tests were conducted based on both historical and readily available public information. 
As described in Chapter II, Fama (1970) proposed three variations of the EMH: weak, 
semistrong, and strong. The semistrong form of the EMH is inclusive of the weak form, 
in that current prices are independent of past prices. For the purposes of the present study, 
it was assumed that bookmakers set prices to balance wagers (as opposed to taking a 
vested position against bettors). Given this assumption, it was possible to draw 
conclusions regarding market efficiency and expected returns. As L. M. Woodland and 
Woodland (1994) noted, unbalanced books cannot be used to study market efficiency 
“because subjective probabilities are revealed only when the books are balanced” (p. 272, 
note 7).  
 A previous study concerned with measuring market efficiency in the NHL totals 
market found evidence of an under-bias, especially for high goal totals. That is, bettors 
preferred to wager on the over, which created profitable opportunities for the under bettor 
(B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010). Similar under-biases were also reported for 
the NFL and NBA (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 2004). More specifically, Paul & 
Weinbach (2002) noted, “psychologically … it makes logical sense that the over becomes 
a more popular bet than the under, as rooting for scoring tends to be easier than cheering 
for a lack of scoring” (p. 259). These findings informed the present study on a 
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foundational level. Five strategies were then devised based on publicly available 
information and common behavioral biases (e.g., heuristics). Statistically, this analysis 
was concerned with significance tests of win proportions from the vantage of the under 
bettor. Once these initial win proportions were computed and assessed, more in-depth 
tests that focused on expected returns were completed.  
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into the following sections: (1) betting 
strategies, (2) data, (3) variables, (4) hypotheses and statistical analyses. The first section 
lists the betting strategies that were tested in this study. When appropriate, the heuristic 
that informed the particular strategy will be identified. Next, a description of the data is 
provided to frame the scope of the study. The variables section provides a description of 
all variables to be considered and calculated. Lastly, the final section outlines the 
hypotheses that were tested, and statistical analyses utilized, to conduct the tests of 
market efficiency and profitability.  
Betting Strategies 
 The following strategies formed the basis of this research and were largely 
motivated by the availability and representativeness heuristics. When appropriate, the 
heuristic associated with a specific strategy will be identified and explained.  
− Strategy 1 – Cumulative Outcomes: Bet the under for all games, regardless of odds. 
Such a strategy is commonly investigated by studies concerned with totals betting 
(e.g., Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 2004). Moreover, this strategy tested 
whether bettors in this market exhibited a similar behavior to those in the NFL (Paul 
& Weinbach, 2002) and NBA (Paul et al., 2004), and NHL (B. M. Woodland & L. 
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M. Woodland, 2010) in that a preference for scoring creates profitable opportunities 
for the under bettor. 
− Strategy 1a: Further examination of Strategy 1 for each closing total. 
Reminder, the closing total is the final betting line (e.g., over/under and 
odds pairing) offered before the start of a game. 
− Strategy 1b: Bet the under whenever the over closing total odds were 
favored in relation to the under odds. This approach simply segmented the 
population further in an attempt to uncover inefficiencies related to 
previously documented under-biases. 
− Strategy 2 – The Hot-Hand Fallacy: Bet the under in games that featured two teams 
with an at or above .500 average against the over total in their previous five games. 
This strategy was concerned with the representativeness heuristic and the likelihood 
of bettors to associate past outcomes with future events. Therefore, inefficiencies 
may be attributable to the hot-hand fallacy and failure to account for general 
regression concepts. 
− Strategy 3 – The Glamor Effect: Bet the under in games that featured one or two 
glamor teams. That is, teams that ranked in the top 15 in terms of popularity 
(variables related to popularity are detailed below). This strategy was grounded in 
the representative heuristic and, more specifically, sentiment bias, wherein bettors 
tend to overvalue more popular teams.  
− Strategy 4 – Playoff Success and Recency Bias: Bet the under in all games that 
featured one or two playoff teams from the previous year. This strategy was 
concerned with the availability heuristic and the tendency for bettors to exude a 
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recency bias. This may lead to inflated totals as bettors may overvalue the scoring 
potential of these playoff teams thus skewing closing totals. 
− Strategy 5 – The Conjunction Fallacy: Bet the under in all games that featured one or 
two teams ranked in the top 15 in terms of analytic variable average in the previous 
season. Inefficiencies may be explained by the conjunction fallacy and the 
perception that the more information that is provided, the more likely a specific 
event will occur.  
Data 
  The data utilized for this study was drawn from multiple sources. All game and 
betting-specific information was obtained from oddswarehouse.com, a website dedicated 
to providing historical sports betting odds. Playoff teams were identified based on 
information readily available from NHL.com. Analytic rankings were gathered from 
hockey-reference.com. Glamor team rankings were assigned based on a fan engagement 
analysis conducted by Lentile (2013).  
 The seasons studied for this analysis spanned from 2011/12 to 2016/17. This 
timeframe was selected as it featured consistency regarding the number and location of 
teams. More specifically, in 2011 the Atlanta Thrashers relocated and became the 
Winnipeg Jets. After this move, no relocation or expansion teams emerged during the 
sample period. Thus, to avoid any statistical errors or biases concerned with team 
relocation, the 2011/12 season was deemed an appropriate starting place.  
 In total, 6,105 regular season games made up the sample less all push bets and 
playoff games. Push bets (n = 761) were excluded because there was no true winner from 
a gambling perspective. Recall, these outcomes occur when the combined number of 
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goals scored equals the closing total. Playoff games (n = 528) were excluded for two 
reasons. First, their inclusion held the potential to create additional biases and/or 
inefficiencies not accounted for in this study. Second, these potential biases could not be 
deduced without additional statistical procedures that were beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
Variables 
 To appropriately gauge the efficiency and profitability of this market, a host of 
variables and calculated statistics were assessed. Table 3.1 provides a listing of all 
variables drawn from the data sources, along with their corresponding notation and a 
brief description. Note that the combination of Under Close Odds (UCL) and Over Close 
Odds (OCL) are what form odds pairings. 
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Table 3.1 
Data Source Variables 
Variable Notation Description 
Home/Away Team HT/AT Coded 1-30 in alphabetical order by city. 
Home Score HS Total number of goals scored by the home team. 
Away Score AS Total number of goals scored by the away team. 
Closing Total Line CL Closing total line set by bookmakers. 
Under Close Odds UCL Odds associated with the closing under total line. 
Over Close Odds OCL Odds associated with the closing over total line 
Total Score TS Combined number of goals for both teams. 
Betting Outcome BO Result based on the closing total. Coded as 1 for a 
winning under bet, 0 for a winning over bet. 
Over Win Percentage  OWP Number of wins and losses against the total line for 
each team reported as a running percentage. 
Playoff Team PT Indicates that a team made the Stanley Cup Playoffs 
the prior year. Coded as 1 if true and 0 otherwise. 
Glamor Team 
Ranking 
GT Coded as 1-30 and remained constant from season 
to season. 
Analytic Rank AR Coded 1-30 and changes each season. 17 total 
variables were factored into the ranking. 
  
 Three variables require additional explanation. First, glamor teams were identified 
using the results of a study conducted by Lentile (2013), who considered five criteria 
when ranking the popularity of each NHL franchise: Google search results, franchise 
Facebook likes, team Twitter followers, franchise worth, and spectator attendance. The 
results and subsequent rankings were utilized for each season in this study. 
Unfortunately, no updates to this study were made nor were there comparable studies 
done prior to or after 2013, which eliminated the possibility to update the rankings each 
seaon. However, it is reasonable to assume that glamor teams, given the seasons 
analyzed, remained relevant and constant.  
 Second, analytic ranks were assigned using aggregated average scores of 17 
variables related to performance. The variables and their descriptions can be found in 
  
  
50 
Table 3.2. Third, over win percentage (OWP) was calculated as a team-specific running 
percentage that reset after each season. More specifically, this figure was indicative of the 
number of times that the final score went over the closing total line in the teams’ previous 
five games. While it is understood that final scores are representative of efforts from both 
teams, it is not uncommon for fans to attribute the scoring success of two teams to a 
single team in a forthcoming matchup. The remaining variables were simplistic in their 
makeup and are commonly referenced throughout hockey and betting communities. 
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Table 3.2 
Analytic Variables 
Variable Description 
Corsi For (CF) Shot attempt differential for a particular 
team. 
Corsi Against (CA) Shot attempt differential for all opposing 
teams. 
Corsi For % (CF%) CF% above 50% indicates that a team 
controls the puck more often than not. 
Fenwick For (FF) Shot attempt differential for a particular 
team, with blocked shots removed. 
Fenwick Against (FA) Shot attempt differential for all opposing 
teams, with blocked shots removed. 
Fenwick For % (FF%) FF% above 50% indicates that a team 
controls the puck more often than not. 
Team on-ice shooting percentage (oiSH%) Team shooting percentage. 
Team on-ice save percentage (oiSV%) Team save percentage. 
Team on-ice shooting percentage (oiSH%) Team shooting percentage. 
Team on-ice save percentage (oiSV%) Team save percentage. 
offensive Zone Start % (oZS%) Number of a times a team starts in their 
offensive zone. 
defensive Zone Start %(dZS%) Number of a times a team starts in their 
defensive zone. 
PDO The efficiency of a team’s shots and their 
ability to stop the opponents’ shot. 
Faceoff Wins (FOW) Number of faceoff wins. 
Faceoff Losses (FOL) Number of faceoff losses. 
Hits (HIT) Total number of hits. 
Blocks (BLK) Total number of blocks. 
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Hypotheses and Statistical Analyses 
 Although findings of economic inefficiency are not uncommon in sport wagering 
markets, rarely are there consistently profitable opportunities for bettors. Recall that in a 
truly efficient market, no formulated strategy should yield higher returns than one simply 
comprised of randomly selected wagers nor should there be opportunities for sustained 
above-average returns. Given that totals in the NHL are set with an odds adjustment, tests 
of win proportions based on a 52.38% break-even win percentage, which is only 
appropriate for flat odds (-110, +100), should not be considered valid. Rather, more 
comprehensive tests must be conducted that consider each odds pairing. L.M. Woodland 
and Woodland (1994, 2001), have been credited with the first odds-specific study of 
market efficiency. Gandar et al. (2002, 2004), amended those tests to provide more 
stringent examinations of market efficiency. For the purposes of this study, the 
derivations and specifications presented by Gandar et al. (2002, 2004) were utilized. 
 Before attempting to calculate any market statistics, it is imperative that the 
notation for favorites and underdogs is understood. Favorite and underdog prices were 
identified as 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, respectively, throughout this analysis. Note that in this market, 
there is no favorite or underdog in the traditional sense. These notations were solely used 
to label prices, not teams. For example, given the odds (-110, +100), 𝛽1 would be written 
as 1.1 while 𝛽2 would be notated as 1.0. These decimal values, or decimal odds, were 
calculated by taking the absolute value of the initial odds figure and dividing by 100 (e.g., 
|-110|/100). In some instances, however, lines in the NHL are offered where both the 
underdog and favorite bettors must wager more than their expected winnings. This 
generally happens when teams are evenly matched, or no clear distinction has been made 
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by oddsmakers on the teams’ goal scoring potential. These lines are referred to as double-
negative lines (e.g., -115, -105). In the scenario provided, -105 (1.05) would be 
considered 𝛽2, as bettors would need to wager a smaller amount to win a $100 compared 
to the -115 (1.15), 𝛽1, odds. Now that the notation for favorites and underdogs is 
understood, tests of market efficiency can be properly conducted.  
 To appropriately assess this market and each strategy, a two-step process was 
utilized. First, tests of market efficiency were conducted for each betting strategy. Given 
that each strategy is unique in its structure, sample size varied depending on the number 
of contests that met the requirements of each strategy. However, a minimum number of 
contests for each odds pairing was established in order to ensure normal distribution of 
the data. These limits are notated within the results tables for each strategy. Regardless, 
the statistical analyses employed were identical.  
 The null hypothesis of efficiency implies that the objective probability of an under 
wager win equals the subjective probability of an under wager win. Otherwise, the 
expected losses would not be equivalent for both sides. Thus, the hypothesis for market 
efficiency is characterized by the following 
HO1: 𝜋 = 𝜌 
H1: 𝜋 > 𝜌 or 𝜋 < 𝜌 
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and 𝜌 is the subjective win probability for a 
given odds pairing from the vantage of the under bettor. Given the symmetry of betting 
data, it is appropriate to study each game from only one betting perspective.  
 The objective probability, 𝜋, of a given odds pairing was calculated as the 
observed proportion of winning under bets (i.e., number of winning under bets divided by 
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total number of games for that odds pairing). Subjective probabilities, however, required 
additional computations. For standard lines (e.g., -110, +100), subjective probabilities, 𝜌, 
were calculated as 
𝜌 =
𝛽1 + 1
2𝛽1 + 𝛽1𝛽2 + 1
 
and for double negative lines (e.g., -130, -105)  
𝜌 =
(1/𝛽1) + 1
((1/𝛽1) + (1/𝛽2) + 2)
 
To determine the significance of differences between the subjective and objective win 
proportions, the observed proportions were converted into a z-score as follows  
𝑧𝑙 =  (𝜋 − 𝜌𝑙)/[((𝜌𝑙(1 − 𝜌𝑙))/ 𝑛𝑙)]
1/2 
where 𝑧𝑙 is the computed z-score for a given odds pairing, 𝜋 is the number of winning 
under bets, or objective win probability, 𝜌𝑙  is the subjective win probability which was 
calculated above, and 𝑛𝑙 is the total number of contests measured for that specific under 
odds line. A two-tailed test of significance was then conducted at both the 10% and 5% 
levels.  
 When a particular odds pairing within a given strategy rejected the null of market 
efficiency, the potential for profitability was assessed. This test was characterized by the 
following 
HO2: 𝜋 ≤ G 
H2: 𝜋 > G 
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and G is the break-even win proportion needed to 
achieve profitability based on the given under odds. This proportion was calculated as  
G =
Amount Risked
Amount Risked + Amount to Win
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For example, given the closing under odds of (-120) and a standard wager of $100, the 
break-even win proportion would be calculated as follows: 
𝐺 =
120
120 + 100
= 54.54% 
When the objective win proportion, 𝜋, of a given strategy met or exceeded the break-even 
win proportion, a one-tailed significance test based on the calculated z-score was 
conducted identical to that utilized to assess market efficiency. The only difference was in 
the handling of 𝜌𝑙 , the subjective probability. For tests of profitability, the value of 𝜌𝑙  was 
specified as the break-even win proportion for the given odds pairing as opposed to the 
calculated subjective probability. This allowed for the test to appropriately assess the 
significance of the difference between the objective win probability and the subjective 
win probability assumed by the break-even win proportion.  
 Analyses of each strategy produced a wealth of statistics. In order to provide more 
interpretable conclusions, strategies were assessed based on two metrics. The first was 
the number of odds pairings that rejected the null of market efficiency and/or 
profitability. The second was actual return on investment figures, which were calculated 
based on those odds pairings that featured significantly profitable outcomes. This allowed 
for conclusions to be drawn regarding the success of a particular strategy from a purely 
financial perspective. The influence of heuristics was also discussed for each strategy and 
for the results as a whole to provide an indication of their influence on the market and its 
outcomes. Ultimately, the results of this research provide a foundation for understanding 
investor decision making in situations of risk and uncertainty through the use of well-
known financial and behavioral concepts.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
 This section presents the statistical results from the semistrong tests of efficiency 
for each betting strategy. The purpose of this research was to analyze the economic 
efficiency and profitability of the NHL totals market through the use of heuristic-based 
betting strategies. The strategies analyzed were comprised of common behavioral biases 
in an effort to provide clearer explanations for any rejections of market efficiency and/or 
instances of significantly positive returns. Within this context, a two-step process was 
utilized. First, tests of market efficiency were conducted for each betting strategy. 
When a particular odds pairing within a given strategy rejected the null of market 
efficiency, the potential for profitability was assessed. Note that in order to present more 
succinct results, profitability metrics were only reported in the results tables when the 
objective odds, 𝜋, exceeded the break-even win proportion, G, of the under closing odds 
being considered.  
 For each strategy, aggregate and individual odds pairing results were reported. It 
is important to note that break-even win proportion (G) and subjective probability (𝜌) 
values were presented as sample averages in Strategy 1 and for the aggregate outcomes. 
The results for each strategy detail the results of the aforementioned hypotheses and are 
accompanied by return on investment (ROI) figures to illustrate the financial returns of 
each strategy. Lastly, conclusions were drawn regarding the efficiency of the NHL totals 
market from both theoretical and applied perspectives.  
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Strategy 1 – Cumulative Outcomes  
 There is documented evidence of bettors deriving significant entertainment value 
from scoring, especially in hockey where scoring is typically minimal and goals come at 
a premium (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010). Relatedly, there is an observed 
under-bias in totals betting, given the psychological predisposition for bettors to wager on 
higher cumulative scores as opposed to lower cumulative scores (Paul & Weinbach, 
2002). As a result, under wagers have been found to produce profitable results in multiple 
leagues. The first strategy under consideration was motivated by this evidence. Two sub-
strategies were also tested that theoretically account for additional biases, which included 
further segmenting the sample based on the closing total and wagering on the under 
whenever the over odds were favored. Complete results are detailed below.  
 Table 4.1 illustrates the results from Strategy 1, where n is the number of games 
included in the strategy sample, 𝜋 indicates the number of winning under wagers, and 
𝜋% is the under win percentage. In this scenario, G, which is the break-even win 
proportion, and 𝜌, the subjective probability, were reported as sample averages. Z-scores 
were assessed for significance at both the 10% and 5% levels. Recall that statistics for the 
null of profitability (z_profit) were only reported if the under win percentage (𝜋%) 
exceeded the break-even win proportion, G. Figure 4.1 displays win percentages and 
break-even win proportions on a seasonal basis in order to present more detailed 
information on the nature of this market. 
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Table 4.1 
Strategy 1 Results 
n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
6105 3104 .5084 .5302 .4587 7.7886**  
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Break-even win percentage and subjective probability are 
calculated as sample averages. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Season win percentages and average break-even win proportions. 
 
 The results for Strategy 1 demonstrate that the market rejected the null of market 
efficiency when all games were assessed. For reference, the null of market efficiency is 
rejected whenever the objective win percentage (𝜋) is not equal to the subjective win 
probability (). Therefore, the outcome of Strategy 1 is not uncommon given the 
variability of the market and the stringent nature of the test. Despite this significant 
measure, the win percentage did not reach a level reject the null of profitability. Even 
with a significant winning percentage over 50%, under bettors would not have enjoyed 
above average, or even marginally profitable returns. In fact, wagering $100 on the under 
in each game in the sample (N = 6105 games) would have resulted in a net loss of 
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$11,612.44 (-2% ROI), which takes into account the average commissions collected by 
the bookmakers. For comparison, returns in the Standard & Poors 500 (S&P 500) during 
this same period averaged roughly 12% ROI (Shiller, 2018). 
 Figure 4.1 further segments to provide insight into changes on a season-by-season 
basis. While the purpose of this research was to assess the market in its entirety and not 
on a seasonal basis, these metrics provide a more detailed look at the operational nature 
and relative efficiency of the market. Aside from the 2013 season (which was shortened 
due to a lockout from 82 to 48 games), each season featured a win percentage that fell 
below the average break-even win proportion needed to reject the null of profitability. 
Even in 2013, however, bettors would have only enjoyed a positive return of $1,713.06 
(3% ROI). These results highlight the overall efficiency of this market from a financial 
sense. While the null of market efficiency was rejected for Strategy 1, the financial 
outcomes and market commissions associated with the closing totals must be considered.  
 Results for Strategy 1a (Table 4.2), which segmented the sample by closing totals, 
featured only one significant measure with no totals rejecting the null of profitability. 
These findings run counter to those of previous studies of the NFL, NBA, and NHL totals 
markets (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 2004; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 
2010), in that significant deviations from market efficiency were not observed for higher 
totals. This finding suggests that this market has become more efficient over time, which 
aligns with the central premise of the EMH. 
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Table 4.2 
Strategy 1a Results 
Closing Total n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
4.5 7 3 .4286 .4834 .4686 -.2121  
5 2099 989 .4712 .4918 .4617 .8746  
5.5 3913 2115 .5405 .5484 .4570 6.5856**  
6 74 39 .5270 .5224 .4759 .8814  
6.5 12 4 .3333 .5361 .4769 -.9954  
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Break-even win percentage and subjective probability are 
calculated as sample averages for the specified closing total. 
 
 Of interest is the significant measure associated with the closing total 5.5, which 
appeared in 3,913 of the 6,105 contests (65%). Despite a win percentage of 54%, which 
did not rise to the level to reject the null of profitability, a simple strategy of wagering on 
the under when the total line closed at 5.5 would have resulted in a net loss of $3,812.82 
(-1% ROI). Additionally, based on the fact that the average total number of goals per 
game during the sample equaled roughly 5.5, conventional thought might suggest that 
value lies in totals that fall above and below this figure. However, wagering on the under 
for each total that did not close at 5.5 would have resulted in a negative net loss of 
$7,799.62 (-4% ROI).  
 Strategies that featured a win percentage over 50%, or over 52.38%, may lead the 
average bettor to assume above-average financial returns. The findings from this strategy, 
however, illuminate the importance of considering commissions, even in the aggregate, 
when determining the financial success of a particular strategy. Figure 4.2 displays profit 
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and loss information for Strategy 1a, which provides further clarification regarding 
returns for specific goal totals. 
 
Figure 4.2. Returns on investment for Strategy 1a.  
 
 There is a documented tendency of bettors to over bet favorites, commonly 
referred to as the reverse favorite-longshot bias (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 
2015; L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2003). In an inefficient market, a contrarian 
strategy of wagering on underdogs could result in returns that are higher than those 
implied by the EMH. Thus, the final test within this strategy focused on the potential for 
inefficiencies due to these overvaluation tendencies. Recall that in the totals market, there 
is no favorite or underdog in the traditional sense. Rather, these labels are reserved for the 
odds associated with each closing total as opposed to the teams themselves.  
Table 4.3 
 
Strategy 1b Results 
n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit  
2241 1049 .4681 .4752 .4636 .4301  
Note. Break-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample 
averages. 
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 Results for Strategy 1b (Table 4.3) yielded no significant measures and featured a 
win percentage that did not rise above 50%. Thus, a contrarian strategy of wagering 
against the odds (e.g., favorite-longshot bias) was not found to be profitable, with losses 
exceeding $2,700 (-1% ROI). Such a result would suggest that betting with the odds may 
be a more favorable strategy, which aligns with previous research and human tendencies 
to prefer favorites and the favored odds (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015; L. 
M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2010).   
Strategy 2 – The Hot-Hand Fallacy 
 A team’s success against the betting line is a common barometer for measuring 
team quality. It is also oftentimes used as a predictor for future performance, especially as 
it relates to goal scoring (Graham & Stott, 2010). A bettor may view recent outcomes 
against the closing total as an indicator of future results and thus wager on the 
continuation of such outcomes. In reality, however, these past events have no real 
predictive value. A simple example of this tendency may be found in the game of 
roulette. Signs above the roulette wheel generally show results from the last twenty spins, 
including number and color. If the last ten spins all landed on red, then a bettor may 
employ one of two strategies. Either bet on red because it is considered “hot” or take the 
contrarian strategy and bet on black because it is “due” (Ma, 2014). 
 When a bettor bases his wagers on the continuation of results, his decision is 
motivated by the hot-hand fallacy, or gamblers fallacy, where he assumes a correlation 
between past events and future outcomes. Thus, he may believe that he has an advantage 
in the market based on his own cognitive bias. In reality, however, each spin of the wheel 
or hockey game played should be viewed as an independent trial (Ma, 2014). Any 
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previous successes, or streaks, are likely a product of statistical variance and fundamental 
chance (i.e., luck). Moreover, these decisions are often based on small sample sizes and 
fail to account for general regression concepts, which statistically invalidate their general 
premise.  
 In an inefficient market, such a bias would inflate goal totals in a way that would 
create favorable outcomes for the under bettor. Thus, this strategy focused on exploiting 
the hot-hand fallacy and the potential for overvaluation by wagering on the under for all 
games that featured two teams with an at or above .500-win percentage against the over 
closing total in their previous five games. The decision to utilize .500 as the benchmark 
was motivated by common sentiments that use this figure as the break-even point for 
determining success in a particular scenario. Since the filter for this strategy was more 
stringent, the cutoff for odds pairings to be included was five contests instead of twenty. 
The data was first considered in the aggregate and then segmented based on the closing 
odds.  
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Table 4.4 
Strategy 2 Results 
 Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
 Totala 1019 541 .5309 .5214 .4720 3.7068** .5427 
U
n
d
er
 O
d
d
s 
F
av
o
re
d
 
(-150, 130) 7 5 .7143 .6000 .4144 1.6105  
(-145, 125) 8 4 .5000 .5918 .4289 .4064  
(-142, 129) 7 4 .5714 .5868 .4231 .7941  
(-140, 120) 8 5 .6250 .5833 .4380 1.0663  
(-139, 126) 5 3 .6000 .5816 .4321 .7580  
(-138, 125) 7 4 .5714 .5798 .4339 .7341  
(-137, 124) 12 5 .4167 .5781 .4358 -.1334  
(-136, 124) 10 5 .5000 .5763 .5033 -.0206  
(-135, 115) 12 6 .5000 .5745 .4822 .1237  
(-135, 123) 17 8 .4706 .5745 .4355 .2917  
(-135, 125) 3 5 .6000 .5745 .4337 .7502  
(-133, 120) 3 5 .6000 .5708 .4433 .7053  
(-133, 121) 13 8 .6154 .5708 .4422 1.2574  
(-132, 120) 6 2 .3333 .5690 .4895 -.7650  
(-131, 119) 7 4 .5714 .5671 .4460 .6674  
(-130, 110) 12 5 .4167 .5652 .4536 -.2567  
(-130, 118) 22 12 .5455 .5656 .4480 .9192  
(-129, 117) 10 3 .3000 .5633 .4475 -.9380  
(-128, 116) 16 5 .3125 .5614 .4496 -1.1020  
(-127, 115) 21 13 .6190 .5595 .4516 1.5416  
(-126, 114) 12 5 .4167 .5575 .4537 -.2579  
(-125, 105) 18 9 .5000 .5556 .4646 .3012  
(-125, 113) 15 5 .3333 .5556 .4559 -.9528  
(-125, 115) 6 2 .3333 .5556 .5095 -.8631  
(-124, 113) 7 4 .5714 .5536 .4570 .6079  
(-123, 111) 4 5 .8000 .5516 .4621 1.5153  
(-123, 112) 19 13 .6842 .5516 .4610 1.9521* 1.1625 
(-121, 110) 19 8 .4211 .5475 .4635 -.3708  
(-120, 100) 13 8 .6154 .5455 .4783 .9897  
(-120, 109) 26 20 .7692 .5455 .4888 2.8607** 2.2916** 
(-120, 110) 5 4 .8000 .5455 .5101 1.2966  
(-119, 108) 15 6 .4000 .5434 .4694 -.5388  
(-118, 107) 10 4 .4000 .5413 .5111 -.7026  
(-117, 106) 16 7 .4375 .5392 .4725 -.2801  
(-116, 105) 11 4 .3636 .5370 .5118 -.9833  
(-105, -105) 52 29 .5577 .5122 .4878 1.0082  
(-115, -105) 10 4 .4000 .5349 .4759 -.4807  
(-115, 104) 22 8 .3636 .5349 .4782 -1.0758  
(-114, 103) 12 7 .5833 .5327 .48047 .7134  
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Table 4.4, continued 
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-113, 102) 13 6 .4615 .5305 .4877 -.1884  
(-111, 101) 23 10 .4348 .5261 .4861 -.4919  
(-110, -110) 12 6 .5000 .5238 .4762 .1651  
(-110, 100) 27 11 .4074 .5238 .5116 -1.0834  
(-109, -101) 11 7 .6364 .5215 .4882 .9830  
(-108, -102) 21 13 .6190 .5192 .4881 1.2007  
(-107, -103) 11 3 .2727 .5169 .4880 -1.4281  
(-106, -104) 8 5 .6250 .5146 .4878 .7766  
O
v
er
 O
d
d
s 
F
av
o
re
d
 
(-115, -105) 9 6 .6667 .5122 .4759 1.1458  
(-106, -104) 11 5 .4545 .5098 .4879 -.2211  
(-107, -103) 8 3 .3750 .5074 .4877 -.6379  
(-108, -102) 24 14 .5833 .5050 .4881 .9336  
(-109, -101) 11 8 .7273 .5025 .4882 1.5862  
(-120, 100) 8 7 .8750 .5000 .4783 2.2464** 2.1213** 
(-110, 100) 31 15 .4839 .5000 .4878 -.0438  
(-111, 101) 19 10 .5263 .4975 .4854 .3570  
(-113, 102) 18 10 .5556 .4950 .4818 .6262  
(-114, 103) 10 5 .5000 .4926 .4806 .1228  
(-115, 104) 13 7 .5385 .4902 .4771 .4431  
(-125, 105) 7 2 .2857 .4878 .5203 -1.2424  
(-116, 105) 18 9 .5000 .4878 .4748 .2145  
(-115, 105) 9 7 .7778 .4878 .4759 1.8133* 1.7404** 
(-117, 106) 12 9 .7500 .4854 .4725 1.9258* 1.8337** 
(-118, 107) 18 10 .5556 .4831 .4702 .7258  
(-119, 108) 13 6 .4615 .4808 .4694 -.0570  
(-120, 109) 7 4 .5714 .4785 .4673 .5522  
(-130, 110) 6 6 1.0000 .4762 .4536 2.6886** 2.5960** 
(-121, 110) 21 13 .6190 .4762 .4635 1.4297  
(-120, 110) 6 5 .8333 .4762 .4646 1.8110* 1.7516** 
(-123, 111) 5 2 .4000 .4739 .4602 -.2699  
(-122, 111) 8 4 .5000 .4739 .4624 .2133  
(-123, 112) 12 7 .5833 .4717 .4591 .8635  
(-125, 113) 11 8 .7273 .4695 .4559 1.8074* 1.7132** 
(-124, 113) 8 4 .5000 .4695 .4589 .2333  
(-126, 114) 7 3 .4286 .4673 .4560 -.1456  
(-135, 115) 9 5 .5556 .4651 .4474 .6525  
(-127, 115) 5 3 .6000 .4651 .4516 .6666  
(-125, 115) 5 1 .2000 .4651 .4538 -1.1400  
(-129, 117) 5 3 .6000 .4608 .4475 .6859  
(-130, 118) 10 4 .4000 .4587 .4454 -.2891  
(-131, 119) 5 3 .6000 .4566 .4434 .7048  
(-133, 121) 5 2 .4000 .4525 .4422 -.1899  
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Table 4.4, continued      
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-135, 123) 5 2 .4000 .4484 .4355 -.1601  
(-136, 124) 5 2 .4000 .4464 .4365 -.1647  
(-138, 125) 6 4 .6667 .4444 .4306 1.1677  
(-140, 127) 5 4 .8000 .4405 .4303 1.6698* 1.6191* 
 Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 5 contests. 
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample 
averages. 
 
 When assessing the market in the aggregate, the null of market efficiency was 
rejected, with the under win percentage exceeding the average break-even win proportion 
needed to reject the null of profitability. Bettors would have enjoyed a positive return of 
$2,400 (2% ROI) despite a failure to reject the null of profitability. When assessing the 
individual odds pairings, significant deviations from market efficiency occurred in nine 
scenarios. Of these nine parings, all exceeded the break-even win percentage needed to 
reject the null of profitability, with eight yielding significant measures. The ROI for these 
eight pairings (n = 83) equated to a net positive return of $4,977.67 (60% ROI).
 Despite this outcome, it is imperative to take into account the sample size and 
context when determining the relative success of Strategy 2. The 83 games that made up 
the eight significant odds pairings are less than 10% of the total sample. Thus, these 
inefficiencies may be more attributable to variability in the market and should not be 
considered as viable predictors of future profitability. As an aside, note that seven odds 
pairings that rejected the null of market efficiency when the over total was favored 
compared to only two when the under total was favored. Such an outcome runs counter to 
the results of Strategy 1b and further highlights the unpredictability of this market. 
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 Overall, this strategy should not be considered a success. As the data suggests, the 
market and its players appear to appropriately consider recent performances, which 
thwarts the potential for significant above average returns based on a hot-hand strategy. 
Even though bettors would have enjoyed positive returns, the lack of significant and 
widespread opportunities for profitability calls into question the reliability of this 
strategy. This highlights the importance of assessing each game independently and 
provides evidence related to the efficiency of this market and the role of bookmakers. 
Ultimately, while investors and gamblers may choose to utilize previous statistics and 
trend data to inform their decisions, it is evident that solely basing decisions on 
correlation metrics will fail to produce substantial returns.  
Strategy 3 – The Glamor Effect 
 Given their notoriety and popularity, glamor teams such as the Dallas Cowboys, 
Los Angeles Lakers, and Chicago Blackhawks are generally overbet by members of the 
public (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015). While not concerned with teams 
specifically, the totals market also lends itself to the glamor effect. Even when bettors are 
not fans of a specific team in a given matchup, it is common for a contest between two 
popular teams (e.g., the Chicago Blackhawks and the Boston Bruins) to garner additional 
over wagers. This premise is supported by Barber and Odean (2008), who hypothesized 
that investors prefer attention-grabbing stocks and are more likely to invest in those that 
have greater notoriety. In the NHL, this creates the potential for sentiment biases to 
emerge for specific matchups that feature more popular teams, leading to the potential for 
bettors’ overconfidence in high score totals. Strategy 3 focuses on this tendency for 
overvaluation. Table 4.5 reports the results of this strategy. 
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Table 4.5 
Strategy 3 Results 
 Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
 Totala 3929 2027 .5159 .5285 .4636 6.5740**  
U
n
d
er
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d
d
s 
F
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(-150, 136) 28 16 .5714 .6000 .4139 1.6921*  
(-147, 134) 30 20 .6667 .5951 .4179 2.7630** .7989 
(-145, 125) 35 20 .5714 .5918 .4289 1.7034*  
(-145, 132) 45 25 .5556 .5918 .4214 1.8231*  
(-143, 130) 27 15 .5556 .5885 .4249 1.3739  
(-142, 129) 43 27 .6279 .5868 .4267 2.6685** .5473 
(-140, 120) 27 12 .4444 .5833 .4380 .0680  
(-140, 127) 42 21 .5000 .5833 .4303 .9128  
(-139, 126) 24 11 .4583 .5816 .4321 .2596  
(-138, 125) 37 22 .5946 .5798 .4339 1.9721** .1824 
(-137, 124) 51 26 .5098 .5781 .4358 1.0664  
(-136, 124) 33 19 .5758 .5763 .4365 1.6128  
(-135, 115) 47 27 .5745 .5745 .4474 1.7519*  
(-135, 123) 68 34 .5000 .5745 .4384 1.0239  
(-134, 122) 28 14 .5000 .5726 .4403 .6366  
(-133, 121) 58 41 .7069 .5707 .4422 4.0592** 2.0941** 
(-132, 120) 37 22 .5946 .5690 .4441 1.8423* .3144 
(-131, 119) 58 28 .4828 .5671 .4460 .5626  
(-130, 110) 40 21 .5250 .5652 .4573 .8600  
(-130, 118) 94 58 .6170 .5652 .4480 3.2954** 1.0132 
(-130, 120) 21 11 .5238 .5652 .4457 .7198  
(-129, 117) 47 29 .6170 .5633 .4500 2.3021** .7423 
(-128, 116) 57 31 .5439 .5614 .4520 1.3943  
(-127, 115) 54 30 .5556 .5595 .4540 1.4996  
(-126, 114) 75 54 .7200 .5575 .4560 4.5909** 2.8334** 
(-125, 105) 47 27 .5745 .5556 .4675 1.4693  
(-125, 113) 85 42 .4941 .5556 .4580 .6681  
(-123, 112) 76 36 .4737 .5516 .4610 .2223  
(-122, 111) 23 12 .5217 .5495 .4631 .5644  
(-121, 110) 75 41 .5467 .5475 .4652 1.4151  
(-120, 100) 49 26 .5306 .5455 .4783 .7336  
(-120, 109) 73 35 .4795 .5455 .4673 .2083  
(-120, 110) 30 17 .5667 .5455 .4661 1.1042  
(-118, 107) 43 18 .4186 .5413 .4716 -.6961  
(-117, 106) 36 19 .5278 .5392 .4738 .6489  
(-116, 105) 57 37 .6491 .5370 .4760 2.6174** 1.6873** 
(-115, -105) 48 27 .5625 .5349 .4770 1.1862  
(-115, 104) 73 38 .5205 .5349 .4880 .5564  
(-115, 104) 24 10 .4167 .5349 .4892 -.7105  
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Table 4.5, continued      
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-114, 103) 36 19 .5278 .5327 .4804 .5684  
(-113, 102) 75 39 .5200 .5305 .4815 .6677  
(-111, 101) 38 21 .5526 .5261 .4861 .8212  
(-110, -110) 38 23 .6053 .5238 .4762 1.5931  
(-110, 100) 95 38 .4000 .5238 .4884 -1.7232  
(-109, -101) 32 16 .5000 .5215 .4907 .1052  
(-108, -102) 58 28 .4828 .5192 .4930 -.1564  
(-107, -103) 47 27 .5745 .5169 .4954 1.0848  
(-106, -104) 29 15 .5172 .5146 .4977 .2107  
(-115, -105) 45 19 .42222 .5122 .5108 -1.1891  
(-105, -105) 149 69 .4631 .5122 .5000 -.9012  
O
v
er
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(-106, -104) 28 10 .3571 .5098 .4977 -1.4873  
(-107, -103) 43 21 .4884 .5074 .4954 -.0916  
(-108, -102) 61 32 .5246 .5050 .4930 .4931  
(-109, -101) 33 17 .5152 .5025 .4907 .2810  
(-120, 100) 31 14 .4516 .5000 .4783 -.2970  
(-110, 100) 86 39 .4535 .5000 .4884 -.6472  
(-111, 101) 43 23 .5349 .4975 .4861 .6407  
(-113, 102) 65 29 .4462 .4950 .4827 -.5898  
(-114, 103) 41 19 .4634 .4926 .4804 -.2183  
(-115, 104) 68 36 .5294 .4902 .4782 .8454  
(-125, 105) 33 19 .5758 .4878 .4675 1.2460  
(-116, 105) 63 27 .4286 .4878 .4760 -.7535  
(-115, 105) 20 6 .3000 .4878 .4770 -1.5847  
(-117, 106) 45 21 .4667 .4854 .4738 -.0955  
(-118, 107) 57 51 .8947 .4831 .4716 6.3996** 6.2186** 
(-118, 108) 42 25 .5952 .4808 .4704 1.6210  
(-120, 109) 49 23 .4694 .4785 .4673 .0294  
(-130, 110) 23 11 .4783 .4762 .4573 .2022  
(-121, 110) 45 20 .4444 .4762 .4652 -.2787  
(-122, 111) 21 9 .4286 .4739 .4641 -.3170  
(-123, 112) 49 26 .5306 .4717 .4610 .9779  
(-125, 113) 55 26 .4727 .4695 .4580 .2190  
(-126, 114) 43 20 .4651 .4673 .4560 .1203  
(-135, 115) 26 15 .5769 .4651 .4474 1.3282  
(-127, 115) 33 10 .3030 .4651 .4540 -1.7414  
(-128, 116) 30 12 .4000 .4630 .4520 -.5717  
(-129, 117) 24 11 .4583 .4608 .4500 .0824  
(-130, 118) 52 23 .4423 .4587 .4480 -.0825  
(-131, 119) 29 13 .4483 .4566 .4460 .0242  
(-140, 120) 22 8 .3636 .4545 .4380 -.7026  
(-133, 121) 28 13 .4643 .4525 .4422 .2355  
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Table 4.5, continued      
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-135, 123) 44 26 .5909 .4484 .4384 2.0389** 3.8217** 
(-140, 127) 28 15 .5357 .4405 .4303 1.1270  
(-142, 129) 21 11 .5238 .4367 .4267 .9000  
 
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 20 contests. 
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample 
averages. 
 
 A sentiment bias for glamor teams assumes increased wagers on the over in 
matchups that feature at least one of these teams. This scenario creates profitable returns 
for the under bettor. As the results of Strategy 3 indicate, the market rejected the null of 
market efficiency for 16 odds pairings. Within these 16 pairings, 11 rejected the null of 
profitability, with five yielding significant outcomes (n = 291). A positive net gain of 
$6,666.54 would have resulted in an ROI of 23%. In the aggregate test, the under win 
percentage rejected the null of market efficiency, but failed to reject the null of 
profitability. Thus, employing this strategy would have resulted in a net loss of $7,028.04 
(-2% ROI).  
 Despite the fact that glamor teams are popularized by the mainstream media and 
members of the general public, the data suggests that closing totals are inclusive of this 
information. While this strategy should not be considered a success given the lack of 
widespread measures of profitability, the significant measures do provide further insight 
into the nature of this market, which could be useful for future studies. In particular, it 
appears that glamor teams in the NHL do not carry the same weight as those in other 
professional sporting leagues (e.g., NBA, NFL). Such a finding is not surprising, given 
that the NHL is less popular than other mainstream sports (Gaines, 2016). Additionally, it 
is important to note the relatively high frequency of significant pairings when the under 
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odds were favored. This aligns with the findings of Strategy 1b, in that wagering with the 
odds appears to be more financially favorable than wagering against them. Although not 
a consistent trend among the strategies tested thus far, it is one to consider. 
 Strategy 4 – Playoff Success and Recency Bias  
 In sport, past outcomes are used as a basis for decision making in situations of 
uncertainty. More specifically, recent and frequent events are more easily recalled and 
subsequently utilized than those that occurred further in the past and infrequently. 
Strategy 4 focuses on bettors’ susceptibility to the availability heuristic and their potential 
to exclude information due to the recency bias.  
In the evaluation of relative team strength, a common metric utilized is prior 
playoff experience. Teams who have been to the playoffs more recently are generally 
viewed as being stronger and thus are likely to attract more betting action. From a totals 
perspective, this means the potential for increased wagering on the over given the 
propensity for recreational bettors to correlate team success with greater goal scoring 
potential. Relying on this mental shortcut, however, places too great an emphasis on 
recent events while failing to account for the larger context. By filtering the sample to 
only include games that featured one or more playoff teams from the previous season, the 
potential for inflated goal totals based on recent successes is assessed. 
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Table 4.6 
Strategy 4 Results 
 Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
 Totala 4091 2105 .5144 .5279 .4647 6.3704**  
U
n
d
er
 O
d
d
s 
F
av
o
re
d
 
(-150, 136) 34 14 .4118 .6000 .4139 -.0254  
(-147, 134) 30 13 .4333 .5951 .4179 .1708  
(-145, 125) 46 23 .5000 .5918 .4235 1.0496  
(-145, 132) 52 22 .4231 .5918 .4214 .0245  
(-143, 130) 34 20 .5882 .5885 .4249 1.9267*  
(-142, 129) 50 25 .5000 .5868 .4267 1.0483  
(-140, 120) 34 22 .6471 .5833 .4380 2.4575** .7537 
(-140, 127) 54 32 .5926 .5833 .4303 2.4093** .1380 
(-139, 126) 29 12 .4138 .5816 .4287 -.0149  
(-138, 125) 39 25 .6410 .5798 .4307 2.6536** .7742 
(-137, 127) 57 28 .4912 .5781 .4918 -.0091  
(-136, 124) 30 15 .5000 .5763 .4336 .7342  
(-135, 115) 44 24 .5455 .5745 .4474 1.3080  
(-135, 123) 69 28 .4058 .5745 .4384 -.5457  
(-134, 122) 31 16 .5161 .5726 .4403 .8507  
(-133, 121) 65 38 .5846 .5708 .5104 1.1966  
(-132, 120) 41 24 .5854 .5690 .4441 1.8204* .2121 
(-131, 119) 55 28 .5091 .5671 .4434 .9804  
(-130, 110) 47 26 .5532 .5652 .4536 1.3720  
(-130, 118) 89 42 .4719 .5652 .4892 -.3260  
(-130, 120) 20 13 .6500 .5652 .4457 1.8378* .7649 
(-129, 117) 43 26 .6047 .5633 .4475 2.0726** .5465 
(-128, 116) 68 40 .5882 .5614 .4520 2.2581** .4459 
(-127, 115) 64 36 .5625 .5595 .4540 1.7441* .0488 
(-126, 114) 73 45 .6164 .5575 .5114 1.7957*  
(-125, 105) 50 27 .5400 .5556 .4646 1.0692  
(-125, 113) 90 49 .5444 .5556 .4580 1.6457* -.2121 
(-123, 112) 77 40 .5195 .5516 .4610 1.0300  
(-122, 111) 25 15 .6000 .5495 .4631 1.3732  
(-121, 110) 72 25 .3472 .5475 .4635 -1.9781  
(-120, 100) 48 28 .5833 .5455 .4783 1.4573  
(-120, 109) 82 42 .5122 .5455 .4673 .8150  
(-120, 110) 22 13 .5909 .5455 .4661 1.1735  
(-119, 108) 47 18 .3830 .5434 .4694 -1.1876  
(-118, 107) 53 28 .5283 .5413 .4716 .8270  
(-117, 106) 42 24 .5714 .5392 .4738 1.2674  
(-116, 106) 60 30 .5000 .5370 .4748 .3914  
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Table 4.6, continued 
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-105, -105) 155 89 .5742 .5122 .4878 2.1517** 1.5442* 
(-115, -105) 44 24 .5455 .5349 .4770 .9093  
(-115, 104) 88 51 .5795 .5349 .4782 1.9032* .8400 
(-114, 103) 40 26 .6500 .5327 .4804 2.1464** 1.4868* 
(-113, 102) 73 33 .4521 .5305 .4827 -.5241  
(-111, 101) 45 24 .5333 .5261 .4861 .6346  
(-110, -110) 41 21 .5122 .5238 .4762 .4616  
(-110, 100) 103 51 .4951 .5238 .4884 .1375  
(-109, -101) 34 14 .4118 .5215 .4882 -.8918  
(-108, -102) 93 32 .3441 .5192 .4881 -2.7780  
(-107, -103) 45 27 .6000 .5169 .4880 1.5035  
(-106, -104) 36 18 .5000 .5146 .4879 .1456  
O
v
er
 O
d
d
s 
F
av
o
re
d
 
(-115, 105) 33 14 .4242 .5122 .4759 -.5944  
(-106, -104) 26 9 .3462 .5098 .4878 -1.4445  
(-107, -103) 44 22 .5000 .5074 .4877 .1628  
(-108, -102) 70 43 .6143 .5050 .4877 2.1182** 1.8296** 
(-109, -101) 32 16 .5000 .5025 .4878 .1385  
(-120, 100) 31 18 .5806 .5000 .4762 1.1645  
(-110, 100) 91 50 .5495 .4878 1.1765 1.1765  
(-111, 101) 47 27 .4468 .4975 .4854 -.5291  
(-113, 102) 56 34 .6071 .4950 .4818 1.8772* 1.6777* 
(-114, 103) 36 17 .4722 .4926 .4794 -.0866  
(-115, 104) 68 42 .6176 .4902 .4771 2.3207** 2.1024** 
(-125, 105) 38 20 .5263 .4878 .4646 .7629  
(-116, 105) 60 25 .4167 .4878 .4748 -.9011  
(-117, 106) 43 17 .3953 .4854 .4725 -1.1028  
(-118, 107) 57 28 .4912 .4831 .4702 .3184  
(-119, 108) 43 16 .3721 .4808 .4679 -1.2594  
(-120, 109) 50 26 .5200 .4785 .4657 .7699  
(-130, 110) 25 12 .4800 .4762 .4536 .2655  
(-121, 110) 44 17 .3864 .4762 .4635 -1.0257  
(-122, 111) 21 10 .4762 .4739 .4613 .1370  
(-123, 112) 46 27 .5870 .4717 .4591 1.7400* 1.5660* 
(-125, 113) 56 27 .4821 .4695 .4559 .3949  
(-124, 113) 26 17 .6538 .4695 .4570 2.0153** 1.8836** 
(-126, 114) 47 23 .4894 .4673 .4537 .4906  
(-135, 115) 25 13 .5200 .4651 .4431 .7743  
(-127, 115) 38 16 .4211 .4651 .4516 -.3788  
(-128, 116) 27 10 .3704 .4630 .4496 -.8271  
(-129, 117) 25 14 .5600 .4608 .4475 1.1314  
(-130, 118) 53 28 .5283 .4587 .4454 1.2137  
(-131, 119) 34 14 .4118 .4566 .4434 -.3715  
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Table 4.6, continued      
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-132, 120) 21 9 .4286 .4545 .4414 -.1185  
(-133, 121) 28 11 .3929 .4525 .4394 -.4965  
(-134, 122) 20 9 .4500 .4505 .4375 .1131  
(-135, 123) 45 18 .4000 .4484 .4355 -.4804  
(-140, 127) 33 14 .4242 .4405 .4269 -.0303  
(-142, 129) 23 12 .5217 .4367 .4231 .9570  
 Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 20 contests. 
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample 
averages. 
 
 Overestimating the influence of recent success (e.g., recency bias) is a common 
bias demonstrated by bettors and investors across markets. As the results shown in Table 
4.6 suggest, the NHL totals market also provides support for this cognitive distortion. 
When compared to the other strategies tested in the present work, this approach featured 
the greatest number of statistical inefficiencies for individual odds pairings. Of the 85 
odds pairings analyzed, 20 rejected the null for market efficiency, with all rising to a 
level to reject the null of profitability. Ultimately, seven of the 20 odds pairings (n = 461) 
yielded significant measures of profitability, which resulted in a positive net gain of 
$9,453.58 (21% ROI). Note that these significant pairings made up only 11% of the 
sample, which makes generalizing these findings difficult in a statistical sense. For the 
aggregate test, the win percentage rejected the null of market efficiency but failed the test 
for profitability. As a result, employing this strategy would have resulted in a net loss of 
$7,964.73 (-2% ROI). 
 As was found to be the case for the previous three strategies, the data suggests 
that the market appropriately considers teams’ recent successes and properly prices this 
information. While the potential for overvaluation is present (as evidenced by the greater 
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number of significant odds pairings), consistent returns or discernable patterns were not 
found. Furthermore, note the frequency of odds pairings that rejected the null of market 
efficiency when either the under (11) or over (8) total was favored. Unlike previous 
strategies where noticeable patterns emerged, this strategy did not yield such an outcome. 
This further supports the notion of market efficiency and that any consistent patterns or 
deviations are likely the result of outcome variability.  
Strategy 5 – The Conjunction Fallacy 
 The use of statistics and data analytics has become commonplace throughout the 
arena of sport. Propagated by Billy Beane and his use of sabermetrics to analyze player 
talent, now commonly referred to as Moneyball (Lewis, 2004), analytics have become 
increasingly advanced and are now widely used to make decisions in situations of risk 
and uncertainty. In recent years, this phenomenon has trickled down from sport 
organizations to members of the public and more specifically, sports bettors. Successful 
sports bettors (e.g., sharps or wiseguys) will argue that building models based on data and 
analytics is imperative to long-term success, given that it is inherently difficult to gain a 
statistical advantage in these marketplaces. The confusion that arises for many novice 
bettors is the choice of which analytics to utilize as the basis for their gambling decisions. 
Moreover, the larger question of whether considering such information will actually lead 
to increased measures of profitability remains uncertain. 
 Strategy 5 focused on the large amount of analytical information that is available 
to the average bettor and the notion that more information will lead to more profitable 
outcomes. Commonly referred to as the conjunction fallacy, this bias exposes our desire 
for more information and our perception that the more information that we are able to 
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obtain, the more likely that an event will occur. Rationally, however, the simultaneous 
co-occurrence of two events cannot be more than the probability of those events 
occurring separately. In an efficient market, closing totals reflect all available analytic 
information, thwarting any opportunity for sustained profitability based on the use of 
analytics.  
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Table 4.7 
Strategy 5 Results 
 Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
 Total 4041 2080 .5147 .5280 .4636 6.5128**  
U
n
d
er
 O
d
d
s 
F
av
o
re
d
 
(-150, 130) 23 9 .3913 .6000 .4202 -.2804  
(-150, 136) 26 12 .4615 .6000 .4139 .4931  
(-147, 134) 21 10 .4762 .5951 .4179 .5411  
(-145, 125) 37 21 .5676 .5918 .4289 1.7045* -.3004 
(-145, 132) 43 19 .4419 .5918 .4214 .2718  
(-144, 131) 20 11 .5500 .5902 .4231 1.1483  
(-143, 130) 32 14 .4375 .5885 .4249 .1442  
(-142, 129) 38 18 .4737 .5868 .4267 .5859  
(-140, 120) 35 16 .4571 .5833 .4380 .2288  
(-140, 127) 54 35 .6481 .5833 .4303 3.2339** .9661 
(-139, 126) 22 13 .5909 .5816 .4321 1.5039  
(-138, 125) 38 20 .5263 .5798 .4339 1.1493  
(-137, 124) 46 21 .4565 .5781 .4358 .2840  
(-136, 124) 29 16 .5517 .5763 .4365 1.2509  
(-135, 115) 50 21 .4200 .5745 .4474 -.3897  
(-135, 123) 69 38 .5507 .5745 .4384 1.8805*  
(-134, 122) 31 14 .4516 .5726 .4381 .1520  
(-133, 121) 65 35 .5385 .5708 .4422 1.5629  
(-132, 120) 39 23 .5897 .5690 .4441 1.8305* .2620 
(-131, 119) 64 35 .5469 .5671 .4460 1.6228  
(-130, 110) 45 21 .4667 .5652 .4573 .1267  
(-130, 118) 90 43 .4778 .5652 .4480 .5682  
(-130, 120) 24 11 .4583 .5652 .4457 .1242  
(-129, 117) 46 30 .6522 .5633 .4500 2.7568** 1.2151 
(-128, 116) 62 35 .5645 .5614 .4520 1.7809* .0494 
(-127, 115) 63 32 .5079 .5595 .4540 .8606  
(-126, 114) 75 46 .6133 .5575 .4560 2.7361** .9731 
(-125, 105) 54 27 .5000 .5556 .4675 .0325  
(-125, 113) 94 51 .5426 .5556 .4580 1.6451*  
(-124, 113) 23 10 .4348 .5536 .4589 -.2321  
(-123, 112) 81 35 .4321 .5516 .4610 -.5213  
(-122, 111) 24 10 .4167 .5495 .4631 -.4558  
(-121, 110) 75 31 .4133 .5475 .4652 -.8999  
(-120, 100) 53 23 .4340 .5455 .4783 -.6456  
(-120, 109) 89 47 .5281 .5455 .4673 1.1496  
(-120, 110) 22 9 .4091 .5455 .4661 -.5360 
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Table 4.7, continued      
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-119, 108) 47 26 .5532 .5434 .4694 1.1506  
(-118, 107) 53 30 .5660 .5413 .4716 1.3773  
(-117, 106) 46 22 .4783 .5392 .4738 .0609  
(-116, 105) 58 33 .5690 .5370 .4748 1.4366  
(-115, 105) 42 20 .4762 .5349 .4892 -.1682  
(-115, 104) 80 49 .6125 .5349 .4782 2.4047** 1.3918* 
(-115, 105) 23 15 .6522 .5349 .4770 1.6822* 1.1278 
(-114, 103) 40 20 .5000 .5327 .4804 .2475  
(-113, 102) 69 35 .5072 .5305 .4827 .4079  
(-111, 101) 51 25 .4902 .5261 .4861 .0592  
(-110, -110) 24 41 .5854 .5238 .5000 1.0932  
(-110, 100) 97 46 .4742 .5238 .4884 -.2787  
(-109, -101) 27 13 .4815 .5215 .4907 -.0958  
(-108, -102) 62 32 .5161 .5192 .4930 .3638  
(-107, -103) 47 22 .4681 .5169 .4954 -.3739  
(-106, -104) 32 16 .5000 .5146 .4977 .0263  
O
v
er
 O
d
d
s 
F
av
o
re
d
 
(-105, -105) 158 84 .5316 .5122 .5000 .7956  
(-115, 105) 41 24 .5854 .5122 .4892 1.2323  
(-106, -104) 32 16 .5000 .5098 .4977 .0263  
(-107, -103) 40 22 .5500 .5074 .4954 .6913  
(-108, -102) 63 33 .5238 .5050 .4930 .4887  
(-109, -101) 26 14 .5385 .5025 .4907 .4871  
(-120, 100) 25 15 .6000 .5000 .4762 1.2395  
(-110, 100) 81 41 .5062 .5000 .4878 .3307  
(-111, 101) 49 31 .6327 .4975 .4854 2.0627** 1.8223* 
(-113, 102) 66 33 .5000 .4950 .4818 .2959  
(-114, 103) 35 19 .5429 .4926 .4794 .7511  
(-115, 104) 58 34 .5862 .4902 .4771 1.6639* 1.1640 
(-125, 105) 31 9 .2903 .4878 .4646 -1.9454  
(-116, 105) 54 17 .3148 .4878 .4748 -2.3537  
(-117, 106) 42 22 .5238 .4854 .5725 .6666  
(-118, 107) 54 25 .4630 .4831 .4702 -.1062  
(-119, 108) 31 19 .6129 .4808 .4679 1.6178  
(-120, 109) 50 26 .5200 .4785 .4657 .7699  
(-130, 110) 20 10 .5000 .4762 .4536 .4171  
(-121, 110) 46 16 .3478 .4762 .4635 -1.5729  
(-122, 111) 22 14 .6364 .4739 .4613 1.6473* 1.0361 
(-123, 112) 46 28 .6087 .4717 .4591 2.0359** 1.0923 
(-125, 113) 57 27 .4737 .4695 .4559 .2702  
(-124, 113) 27 15 .5556 .4695 .4570 1.0284  
(-126, 114) 40 22 .5500 .4673 .4537 1.2229  
(-135, 115) 24 15 .6250 .4651 .4431 1.7942* .8851 
  
  
79 
Table 4.7, continued      
Odds Pairing n 𝜋 𝜋% G  z_mkt eff. z_profit 
(-127, 115) 39 16 .4103 .4651 .4516 -.5192  
(-128, 116) 23 17 .7391 .4630 .4496 2.7918** 1.9438** 
(-129, 117) 20 12 .6000 .4608 .4475 1.3717  
(-130, 118) 49 26 .5306 .4587 .4454 1.1995  
(-131, 119) 25 9 .3600 .4566 .4434 -.8396  
(-140, 120) 21 10 .4762 .4545 .4331 .3988  
(-132, 120) 20 10 .5000 .4545 .4414 .5277  
(-131, 121) 22 10 .4545 .4394 .5394 .1429  
(-135, 123) 41 22 .5366 .4484 .4355 1.3054  
(-140, 127) 31 15 .4839 .4405 .4269 .6418  
(-142, 129) 20 12 .6000 .4367 .4231 1.6008  
 
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 20 contests. 
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample 
averages. 
 
 Results for this strategy are consistent with the general premise of the conjunction 
fallacy, in that more information does not improve one’s ability to make more accurate 
decisions. This strategy featured a very small number of profitable odds pairings. While 
the three significant outcomes yielded returns of $3,863.87 (25% ROI), the small sample 
size (n = 152) does not allow for statistically valid conclusions to be drawn. When 
assessing this strategy in the aggregate, bettors would have lost $7,903.30 (-2% ROI). 
Given the lack of widespread opportunities for positive returns, the evidence 
demonstrates that this strategy is not profitable. 
 The influx of data and public information available to bettors in the current 
marketplace may actually hinder their potential for success. Having to consider and 
process numerous analytic variables and metrics is an undoubtedly daunting task, even 
for the most experienced bettor. Strategy 5 suggests that consideration all of the available 
metrics may not put one on the ideal avenue for success. While this is not to suggest that 
bettors and investors should completely ignore all analytic data, such information should 
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not be considered in a vacuum. Rather, it should be integrated with other forms of 
information (e.g., location, roster makeup, injuries, etc.) in an effort to maximize one’s 
advantage in the marketplace. Therefore, while the conjunction fallacy may have been a 
factor in this particular instance, the simplistic nature of this strategy and analytics 
variables utilized should be considered before making definitive conclusions regarding 
the use of analytics in sports betting. 
Conclusion 
 The five strategies analyzed in the present work provide a comprehensive outlook 
on the efficiency and profitability of this market. These results provide new and valuable 
insights for bettors into the nature of the NHL totals market. In the aggregate, each 
strategy featured a win percentage that rejected the null of market efficiency. Only one 
(Strategy 2) rejected the null of profitability, ultimately yielding an insignificant outcome 
(p = .2937). Based on these results, negative returns were common and substantial (see 
Figure 4.3).   
 
Figure 4.3. Aggregate return figures for each of the five strategies analyzed. 
 
 Similarly, individual odds pairings did not feature consistently significant 
outcomes and returns, which accentuates the efficient nature of the market. While the null 
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in part to the stringent nature of the test), the lack of significant outcomes is what 
motivated the labeling of this market as efficient. Moreover, the lack of opportunities for 
sustained profitability demonstrates the importance of considering the odds associated 
with each closing total when attempting to determine the success of a particular strategy. 
Failure to consider these prices would have resulted in inaccurate conclusions and would 
not have allowed for true profit/loss figures to be calculated.  
 As Figure 4.4 illustrates, only Strategy 2 produced an outcome with a net positive 
return of $2,820.48. Theoretically, this strategy would be considered a market anomaly, 
indicating that such a result is unlikely to occur again in the future. The remaining 
strategies lost $7,028.04, $7,544.62, and $7,802.66, respectively. Therefore, when 
employing all strategies simultaneously, a bettor would have lost $19,554.84 over the six 
seasons analyzed. This supports the concept of market efficiency because above-average 
returns, albeit present in one circumstance, were not widespread. 
 
Figure 4.4. Odds pairings return figures for Strategies 2, 3, 4, and 5.2 
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 Considering odds pairings when determining the efficiency of this market is 
imperative. B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland’s (2010) previous study that found this 
market to be inefficient and profitable utilized a standard break-even win proportion of 
.5238 (52.38%), which is appropriate only for flat odds (-110, 100) structures, for their 
tests of profitability. Thus, their results and conclusions should be interpreted with 
caution. Failure to take into account these odds pairings does not properly reflect the 
market’s variable odds structure. The results of the present study concluded that the NHL 
totals market was semistrong efficient, given the limited number of statistically 
significant deviations from market efficiency and subsequent opportunities to achieve 
above-average returns. This conclusion is further discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The National Hockey League totals market provides a unique setting for the 
testing of financial theories. In this relatively simplified context where data is readily 
available, theories such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis can be rigorously tested. 
Thus, insights may be drawn regarding the human processing of information (e.g., 
heuristics) and the pricing of assets (e.g., contests). Previous tests of this market and 
similar markets in other professional leagues have found varying degrees of inefficiency 
for specific total lines, especially for high totals (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 
2004; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010). Focusing on the NHL specifically, B. 
M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2010) found that a clear under bias existed in the 
NHL totals market (2005-2006 to 2009-2010). However, this bias appears to have 
diminished over time. This was hypothesized by B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland 
(2010) and is consistent with many biases in the sports wagering and investment 
literature. 
 This paper sought to extend the literature related to market efficiency in sports 
wagering markets by including odds and expanding the data set. These additions allowed 
the present research to overcome some of the limitations of previous studies. Two notable 
findings will be discussed in detail in this chapter. The first is that the NHL market is 
most accurately characterized as semistrong efficient. This characterization holds despite 
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the rejection of the null of market efficiency for each aggregate test, because when 
commissions were considered, all but one strategy yielded a negative return.  
 The second notable finding is the lack of influence of heuristics and heuristic-
based strategies on betting outcomes. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note, while 
heuristics generally provide reliable estimates, decision making biases are common and 
can lead to errors in judgement and misperceptions related to probability and chance. It is 
important to remember that this research does not include an exhaustive exploration of 
every possible facet of the market. Thus, future investigations with the use of more recent 
data have the potential to produce new findings about the influence of heuristic-based 
strategies. 
Efficient Market Hypothesis Discussion 
 The characterization of this market as largely semistrong efficient was motivated 
by the lack of statistically significant outcomes for analyses of efficiency and 
profitability. Moreover, individual odds pairings, which are crucial to consider, did not 
feature consistent trends or above-average returns. This supports the notion of market 
efficiency. Therefore, it appeared that instances of inefficiency were random with no 
consistent pattern among strategies. This aligns with the conclusions of Rishe (1997), 
who determined “that the betting market (as a whole) can be inefficient in both the short 
run and long run, but is efficient with respect to any particular strategy” (p. 4). 
Accordingly, the results of the present study indicate that bettors who employ particular 
strategies should expect consistent negative returns on average. Thus, despite updated 
information, data, and more sophisticated modeling techniques, the market aligns with 
the premise of the EMH.   
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 While there are a host of potential explanations for this finding, four will be 
detailed as they pertain to this market specifically. The first is the nature of totals betting 
and the lack of attention that the NHL receives. From a media standpoint, the NHL is not 
a central focus of the major sports networks. Rather, attention is placed primarily on the 
other three major North American sports leagues (NFL, NBA, MLB), which may deter 
bettors from becoming involved in the NHL markets due to unfamiliarity. From a betting 
standpoint, totals betting is also largely ignored in the media discourse. Attention is rather 
placed on how teams will perform against the point spread or which team will emerge the 
winner of a particular matchup. Again, this may deter bettors from becoming involved in 
the totals market due to a lack of understanding and awareness. Moreover, recreational 
bettors are generally more interested in aligning their investments with a particular team, 
rather than an overall total, which requires attention to be given to both sides of a contest. 
 The lack of scoring variability and the variable odds makeup of this market may 
also contribute to the finding of efficiency. Aside from the MLB, the NFL and NBA 
feature final scores that are oftentimes much larger than those in the NHL, which 
averaged roughly 5.5 goals during the seasons analyzed in the present work. A central 
tenant of investing, whether in the stock market or otherwise, is acting when prices reach 
levels that suggest a statistical advantage or financial value. Such a position will 
undoubtedly vary from individual to individual, as each investor is subject to his or her 
own interpretation of the available data.  
 The absence of variability in scoring in the NHL, however, may limit the 
occurrence of value plays for bettors, especially when one considers that odds are more 
likely to shift than totals. For example, a bettor may find value in the following line:  
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 Boston Bruins at Washington Capitals: 6over+110; 6under-105 
However, this advantage may be eliminated once other bettors become involved in the 
market and force the bookmaker to raise the under odds from -105 to -125 in order to 
balance the wagers. This new line may then read as follows: 
 Boston Bruins at Washington Capitals: 6over+120; 6under-125 
This shift now requires a greater investment without the same return potential. What was 
once a value play now simply becomes another 50/50 proposition for this particular 
bettor. Thus, the lack of variability in scoring and the variable odds nature of this market, 
which allows bookmakers to alter potential payouts, may contribute to the finding of 
market efficiency.  
 From an operational standpoint, the NHL totals market features low limits and 
lacks large return potential, which may thwart potential investors from becoming 
involved. While this may not deter the recreational bettor, professional gamblers may 
choose to invest their money elsewhere, thus eliminating the potential for large bets to 
skew the market prices away from efficient values. For example, the popular online 
sportsbook Bovada limits wagers on totals in the NHL to $500 per wager, the lowest of 
the four major North American sports. In comparison, the Bovada limit for the NFL point 
spread market is $5,000 per wager. In cases such as this, the influx of money from both 
professional and recreational bettors has a greater potential to skew lines away from 
efficient values.     
 In addition to these low limits, the lack of investor development and maturation in 
this market may explain the finding of market efficiency. In financial markets, investors 
are largely motived by wealth propositions and must heavily consider the amount of risk 
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associated with each outcome. In betting markets, however, participants are generally 
recreational, operating with stakes that are relatively small in comparison. Such factors 
may contribute to decisions that are motivated by emotion rather than profit 
maximization. Therefore, given the potential that there are less players and lower 
financial stakes, it is likely that prices will remain largely efficient. 
Heuristic Discussion 
 Investigating the influence of heuristics on the efficiency of the NHL totals 
market was a central component of this research. As is common in many investment-
based fields, biases are expected to arise due to the nature of human cognitive processes. 
One of the fundamental challenges encountered in decision making research is how to 
best measure and quantify the impact of these decisions (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). The 
present work aimed to formulate strategies that focus on exploiting investor biases to gain 
a better understanding of if and when these biases may be influential. Moreover, with 
such information it would be possible to create more directed investment models that 
may provide similar insights in other markets.   
 Unlike previous studies (e.g., Camerer, 1989; B. M. Woodland & L. M. 
Woodland, 2016; L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2015; Paul & Weinbach, 2005), 
the present results indicate that heuristic-based strategies do not lead to opportunities for 
profitability. Rather, it appears that the NHL market appropriately incorporated the 
information that influenced each strategy, which limited the potential for consistent and 
above-average returns. The only instance where a heuristic did appear to have an 
influence was in Strategy 5, where the results appeared to support the notion that more 
information is not necessarily beneficial when it comes to probabilistic judgments (e.g., 
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the conjunction effect). It should be stated however, that the simplistic design of this 
strategy, which involved simply averaging advanced metrics to rank teams, may not 
produce truly valid and generalizable conclusions.  
 There are four potential explanations that may account for the lack of the impact 
that heuristics appear to have on this market. Given the nature of these cognitive 
concepts, explanations will be largely theoretical, since the heuristics proposed by 
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) which motivated the tested strategies are descriptive and 
untestable in the empirical sense (Berg & Girgerenzer, 2010; Forbes, Hudson, Skerratt, & 
Soufian, 2015). The first explanation has to deal with the variable odds structure 
associated with each closing total. In the season wins total markets where heuristics were 
found to have an influence, flat odds (-110, 100) are employed. Thus, the totals 
themselves are forced to shift since the odds remain consistent. In the NHL totals market 
however, the variable odds structure allows bookmakers to adjust prices without 
modifying totals, which aids in the elimination of profitable avenues.   
 For example, in a matchup between two glamor teams, the total may be inflated 
due to the popularity of the teams. If in fact, the amount of wagers (and dollars) was 
significantly higher on the over side, bookmakers could adjust the odds, not the total, to 
make the under price more appealing. Such an adjustment has the potential to be 
beneficial to the bookmaker in two ways. First, this shift assumes that new bettors would 
wager on the under, given the more attractive price affixed to the total. Second, the 
financial liability of the bookmaker becomes minimized, as the increased under wagers 
would aid in balancing their book. While tracking line movements such as these was 
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beyond the scope of the present research, this shift in the odds may explain the lack of 
inefficient closing totals. 
 The second explanation posits that, on average, NHL bettors are more skilled and 
sophisticated than those in other leagues and betting markets. Similar to B. M. Woodland 
& L. M. Woodland’s (2015) analysis of the NBA season win totals market, the finding of 
economic efficiency in the present research suggest that NHL bettors are equipped to 
avoid the pitfalls of heuristic-based strategies. As Reber (1996) describes, “basketball has 
historically attracted the most sophisticated sports bettors, folks who are more 
knowledgeable about the game than those who bet [on] football and baseball” (p. 309). 
The results of this study would suggest that NHL bettors, similar to NBA bettors, are 
more informed than those in the NFL. The nature of the sport and lack of widespread 
popularity also makes it less attractive as an investment option than the more prevalent 
American leagues. This is evidenced by the fact that totals and their associated odds 
closed at relatively efficient values on a consistent basis over the six seasons evaluated in 
the current study. While this claim cannot be empirically supported through solely 
quantitative analysis, it is aided by the results of the present study and the apparent nature 
of the individuals participating in the market. 
 The ambiguity of line pricing is another factor that should be considered. Prices in 
gambling markets, much like those in the stock market, are vulnerable to social 
influences because there are no accepted theories that definitively explain how prices are 
set and adjusted (Shiller, 1984, 2015). Everyday sports bettors, who make up a large 
portion of the gambling industry, operate with no models or very limited models built 
around forecasting prices and outcomes. The primary issue that arises for these 
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individuals is how to value and quantify new information as it is introduced into the 
market. For example, an injury to a top goaltender will undoubtedly have an impact on 
the line/odds set by bookmakers. While recreational bettors will likely also consider this 
information, there is no objective way to know how to appropriately price such 
information. Is it worth a half point on the point total (e.g., 6 to 5.5), or a drastic shift in 
the odds (e.g., -110 [favorite] to +125 [underdog]), or both? Similar questions may be 
raised regarding appropriate prices for glamor team matchups and the influence of prior 
playoff success. The inability to objectively price this information is what may have led 
to the finding of economic efficiency. If bettors had this ability, heuristic-based strategies 
may be marginally more successful. 
 The final potential explanation centers on the concept of publicly available 
information and its inclusion in prices as a part of the EMH. Despite findings that 
heuristic-based strategies have produced profitable outcomes in various leagues (B. M. 
Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015, 2016; L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2015), 
similar approaches were not found to be successful in the NHL totals market. This 
implies that once these strategies and processes become publicly available, they are 
subsequently exploited by bettors to a degree that eliminates their potential to yield 
profitable measures in the future. It is important to note that such a postulation does not 
suggest that these biases (e.g., failure to account for regression, recency bias, sentiment 
bias, etc.) are not present, but rather that that market has appropriately considered their 
influence. This aligns with a core tenant of the EMH, which suggests that prices are 
inclusive of all publicly available information to the degree that technical analysis will 
not permit above-average returns. 
  
  
91 
Generalizability 
 The generalizability of these findings to other sport and financial markets is 
limited. This section will focus on the theoretical framework of market efficiency and the 
performance of the proposed betting strategies. As it relates to the EMH, the results of the 
present study clearly demonstrate that this market operates efficiently. While the 
significant outcomes related to market efficiency may lead members of the academic 
community to refute the characterization of the market as efficient, practitioners are more 
interested in financial outcomes than theoretical conclusions. Much like other sport 
wagering markets, there were no opportunities for profitable returns that were sizeable 
enough to warrant a six-year investment commitment. The one strategy that did feature a 
positive outcome (Strategy 2), only netted roughly $2,800. Even for a beginning investor, 
such a return would not warrant further use of such a strategy.  
 The instances of increased ROI for predicted odds pairings can largely be 
explained by variability and not by predictability. Practically, it would be very difficult to 
accurately apply findings related to randomly occurring specific odds pairings to future 
seasons and other markets. Unless the profitability of a particular odds pairing continues 
to exist over a significant period of time (e.g., 3-5 seasons) the market would remain 
efficient.  
 The findings of this research are generalizable in the sense that they support the 
theory of efficient markets. Despite the consideration of advanced metrics and strategies 
built upon theories of heuristics, outcomes are ultimately decided by the coaches and 
players, both of which contain the human element and thus embody a degree of 
randomness that cannot be consistently predicted. 
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Future Research 
 This study examined the efficiency of the NHL totals market and the influence 
that heuristics had on betting outcomes. While research related to betting market 
efficiency is far from novel, little research has directly assessed the degree to which 
heuristics influence the market and its prices. This section will outline three avenues for 
future research to build upon these findings.  
 First, the influence of heuristics has only been directly studied in the season wins 
total market and now in the NHL totals market. Given the abundance of heuristics-based 
literature in the various financial and investment markets, there are clear methods to 
apply these concepts to other sport wagering markets. In particular, the college football 
betting market may feature a degree of heuristics-based inefficiency, given the magnitude 
and intensity of this particular fan base. Thus, strategies concerned with exploiting fan 
loyalty in games that feature high-profile teams may lead to profitable measures.  
 Second, more detailed betting strategies could be articulated that center on the 
wealth of publicly available metrics. This study took the simple approach of averaging 
advanced metrics to rank teams from year to year. For informed bettors and investors, 
analysis of more in-depth strategies would be appealing. In particular, the determination 
of whether team versus player-specific statistics are more predictive would aid in strategy 
and model creation. The reality is that such information is readily available, yet novices 
are not equipped to appropriately assess these data. While future research is likely to vary 
in its conclusions regarding these metrics, there is a market for such practical information 
that could be coupled with further tests of market efficiency. 
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 Lastly, as is the case in financial markets, opportunities exist for new and creative 
tests to be conducted that are theoretically grounded and assume efficient prices. For 
example, the ambiguity of price setting and the value that certain information has to the 
betting line is largely unknown. Building a model that attempts to quantify such 
information, under the notion that the market operates efficiently, would be both 
interesting and applicable. Another potential avenue would be to explore the predictive 
power of advanced metrics, not in an effort to gain a statistical advantage in the market, 
but to better understand how such information should be processed. For example, should 
goaltenders be more highly valued than first-line centers? How much influence does a 
top-tier goaltender have on the closing total in the NHL totals market? Such questions 
have become more relevant in the present day marketplace and have the potential to 
produce applicable results. 
Limitations 
 As with any research endeavor, this research featured limitations that should be 
addressed. The primary limitation lies in the assumption that sportsbook seek to balance 
the books as opposed to taking a vested position in the market and against bettors. Such 
an assumption is consistent with previous research and is necessary to allow for the 
calculation of subjective probabilities and for accurate conclusions to be draw. However, 
it would be ideal to know precisely how bookmakers operate to draw more precise 
conclusions. A second limitation is the small sample size associated with the various odds 
pairings in Strategy 2. The stringent nature of this test thwarted the potential to obtain 
larger samples for each pairing, which may have influenced the volume of significant 
outcomes. Lastly, this research included games played during lockout season of 2013 
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which was shortened from 82 to 48 games. Given that above average returns were 
observed only for this season (see Figure 4.1), there is the potential that its inclusion may 
have had an impact on the results of the betting outcomes.  
Conclusion 
 Sport wagering markets have evolved and grown considerably in recent years. 
This rise in notoriety has created a unique line of research centered on empirical tests of 
market efficiency and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. To date, only one other study has 
analyzed the NHL totals market (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010), yet it failed 
to account for the variable odds associated with each closing total and did not consider 
the potential influence of heuristics. By employing a more expansive data set and 
focusing specifically on exploiting bettor biases (e.g., heuristics), this research sought to 
provide a more detailed assessment of the NHL totals market.   
 Statistical tests yielded results that largely supported the EMH, in that prices 
appeared to accurately reflect all publicly available information, making it difficult to 
achieve above-average returns. While rejection of the initial hypothesis (HO1: 𝜋=𝜌) was 
common in the aggregate, the odds-specific tests featured minimal significant outcomes. 
Moreover, rarely did win percentages reach a level to reject the null of profitability and 
even fewer produced profitable outcomes. While some might argue that rejection of HO1, 
to any degree, would indicate an inefficient market, such an argument is misleading from 
a financial perspective. In every strategy except for Strategy 2, bettors would have 
experienced significant financial loss, to a degree that would generally not permit the 
recreational bettor to sustain involvement in the market. Thus, given that this research is 
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geared toward practical applicability, the characterization of the market as efficient was 
largely motivated by these financial outcomes. 
 A central aim of this research was to understand whether the exploitation of 
heuristics would lead to increased levels of profitability. As such, the strategies tested 
were motivated by various known cognitive biases (e.g., the recency bias, the hot-hand 
fallacy, the conjunction fallacy). Unlike findings for the various season wins total 
markets (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015, 2016; L. M. Woodland & B. M. 
Woodland, 2015), heuristics did not appear to affect the behavior of bettors and the 
efficiency of this market. In fact, the identified strategies would have resulted in 
significant losses totaling close to $20,000. Therefore, it can be concluded that in this 
market both bookmakers and bettors appropriately consider the potential for these biases 
to create inefficient closing totals/odds.  
 The results of this research provide strong indication that the NHL market 
operates efficiently and appropriately considers the potential for biases to skew closing 
lines. Three explanations of these findings should be noted in particular. The first 
considers the variable odds nature of the market, and the fact that bookmakers can adjust 
prices quickly to achieve market efficiency. The second is the ambiguity in how 
totals/odds are set. There is no published information that quantifies certain metrics and 
the relative strength of particular teams. This makes the creation of tailored betting 
strategies difficult. Finally, the speed at which information is incorporated into the market 
is likely the primary influencer of these findings. When a bettor finds a profitable strategy 
and acts upon it, such information is quickly absorbed into the market, diminishing future 
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potential for profitable strategies. Thus, the above-average returns of Strategy 2 will, in 
all likelihood, disappear in the future, given the rate at which information is processed. 
 Overall, this research provides further insight to the efficient nature of sport 
wagering markets. While findings of isolated inefficiencies are not uncommon in the 
literature, such outcomes rarely lead to above-average returns and invariably diminish 
over time. Future research should begin to focus on how prices are set and the value of 
certain types of information (e.g., injuries, prior playoff success). This would allow for 
the formulation of more informed strategies, which can then be tested against the efficient 
market model. As betting markets continue to grow and flourish, research related to their 
financial potential will remain relevant.
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